
Playing Dead
Do the Democrats really want reform? by Andrew Cockburn
Your Face Tomorrow
The puzzle of AI facial recognition by Michael W. Clune
Debt Reckoning
Has the Treasury market started to crack? by Mary Childs

Do the Democrats really want reform? by Andrew Cockburn
The puzzle of AI facial recognition by Michael W. Clune
Has the Treasury market started to crack? by Mary Childs
A high school student opens her laptop and types a question: What is Hamlet really about? Within seconds, a sleek block of text appears—elegant, articulate, and seemingly insightful. She pastes it into her assignment, hits submit, and moves on. But something vital is lost—not just effort, not merely time—but a deeper encounter with ambiguity, complexity, and meaning. What if the greatest threat to our intellect isn’t ignorance—but the ease of instant answers?

In a world increasingly saturated with generative AI (GenAI), our relationship to knowledge is undergoing a tectonic shift. These systems can summarize texts, mimic reasoning, and simulate creativity with uncanny fluency. But what happens to intellectual inquiry when answers arrive too easily? Are we growing more informed—or less thoughtful?
To navigate this evolving landscape, we turn to two illuminating frameworks: Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow and Chrysi Rapanta et al.’s essay Critical GenAI Literacy: Postdigital Configurations. Kahneman maps out how our brains process thought; Rapanta reframes how AI reshapes the very context in which that thinking unfolds. Together, they urge us not to reject the machine, but to think against it—deliberately, ethically, and curiously.
Kahneman’s landmark theory proposes that human thought operates through two systems. System 1 is fast, automatic, and emotional. It leaps to conclusions, draws on experience, and navigates the world with minimal friction. System 2 is slow, deliberate, and analytical. It demands effort—and pays in insight.
GenAI is tailor-made to flatter System 1. Ask it to analyze a poem, explain a philosophical idea, or write a business proposal, and it complies—instantly, smoothly, and often convincingly. This fluency is seductive. But beneath its polish lies a deeper concern: the atrophy of critical thinking. By bypassing the cognitive friction that activates System 2, GenAI risks reducing inquiry to passive consumption.
As Nicholas Carr warned in The Shallows, the internet already primes us for speed, scanning, and surface engagement. GenAI, he might say today, elevates that tendency to an art form. When the answer is coherent and immediate, why wrestle to understand? Yet intellectual effort isn’t wasted motion—it’s precisely where meaning is made.
Rapanta and her co-authors offer a vital reframing: GenAI is not merely a tool but a cultural actor. It shapes epistemologies, values, and intellectual habits. Hence, the need for critical GenAI literacy—the ability not only to use GenAI but to interrogate its assumptions, biases, and effects.
Algorithms are not neutral. As Safiya Umoja Noble demonstrated in Algorithms of Oppression, search engines and AI models reflect the data they’re trained on—data steeped in historical inequality and structural bias. GenAI inherits these distortions, even while presenting answers with a sheen of objectivity.
Rapanta’s framework insists that genuine literacy means questioning more than content. What is the provenance of this output? What cultural filters shaped its formation? Whose voices are amplified—and whose are missing? Only through such questions do we begin to reclaim intellectual agency in an algorithmically curated world.
Kahneman reveals how prone we are to cognitive biases—anchoring, availability, overconfidence—all tendencies that lead System 1 astray. GenAI, far from correcting these habits, may reinforce them. Its outputs reflect dominant ideologies, rarely revealing assumptions or acknowledging blind spots.
Rapanta et al. propose a solution grounded in epistemic courage. Critical GenAI literacy is less a checklist than a posture: of reflective questioning, skepticism, and moral awareness. It invites us to slow down and dwell in complexity—not just asking “What does this mean?” but “Who decides what this means—and why?”
Douglas Rushkoff’s Program or Be Programmed calls for digital literacy that cultivates agency. In this light, curiosity becomes cultural resistance—a refusal to surrender interpretive power to the machine. It’s not just about knowing how to use GenAI; it’s about knowing how to think around it.
Interpretation is inherently plural—shaped by lens, context, and resonance. Kahneman would argue that System 1 offers the quick reading: plot, tone, emotional impact. System 2—skeptical, slow—reveals irony, contradiction, and ambiguity.
GenAI can simulate literary analysis with finesse. Ask it to unpack Hamlet or Beloved, and it may return a plausible, polished interpretation. But it risks smoothing over the tensions that give literature its power. It defaults to mainstream readings, often omitting feminist, postcolonial, or psychoanalytic complexities.
Rapanta’s proposed pedagogy is dialogic. Let students compare their interpretations with GenAI’s: where do they diverge? What does the machine miss? How might different readers dissent? This meta-curiosity fosters humility and depth—not just with the text, but with the interpretive act itself.
This reimagining impacts education profoundly. Critical literacy in the GenAI era must include:
Educators become co-inquirers, modeling skepticism, creativity, and ethical interrogation. Classrooms become sites of dialogic resistance—not rejecting AI, but humanizing its use by re-centering inquiry.
A study from Microsoft and Carnegie Mellon highlights a concern: when users over-trust GenAI, they exert less cognitive effort. Engagement drops. Retention suffers. Trust, in excess, dulls curiosity.
Emerging neurocognitive research suggests overreliance on GenAI may dampen activation in brain regions associated with semantic depth. A speculative analysis from MIT Media Lab might show how effortless outputs reduce the intellectual stretch required to create meaning.
But friction isn’t failure—it’s where real insight begins. Miles Berry, in his work on computing education, reminds us that learning lives in the struggle, not the shortcut. GenAI may offer convenience, but it bypasses the missteps and epiphanies that nurture understanding.
Creativity, Berry insists, is not merely pattern assembly. It’s experimentation under uncertainty—refined through doubt and dialogue. Kahneman would agree: System 2 thinking, while difficult, is where human cognition finds its richest rewards.
The implications reach beyond academia. Curiosity fuels critical citizenship, ethical awareness, and democratic resilience. GenAI may simulate insight—but wonder must remain human.
Ezra Lockhart, writing in the Journal of Cultural Cognitive Science, contends that true creativity depends on emotional resonance, relational depth, and moral imagination—qualities AI cannot emulate. Drawing on Rollo May and Judith Butler, Lockhart reframes creativity as a courageous way of engaging with the world.
In this light, curiosity becomes virtue. It refuses certainty, embraces ambiguity, and chooses wonder over efficiency. It is this moral posture—joyfully rebellious and endlessly inquisitive—that GenAI cannot provide, but may help provoke.
A flourishing postdigital intellectual culture would:
In this culture, Kahneman’s System 2 becomes more than cognition—it becomes character. Rapanta’s framework becomes intellectual activism. Curiosity—tenacious, humble, radiant—becomes our compass.
The future of thought will not be defined by how well machines simulate reasoning, but by how deeply we choose to think with them—and, often, against them. Daniel Kahneman reminds us that genuine insight comes not from ease, but from effort—from the deliberate activation of System 2 when System 1 seeks comfort. Rapanta and colleagues push further, revealing GenAI as a cultural force worthy of interrogation.
GenAI offers astonishing capabilities: broader access to knowledge, imaginative collaboration, and new modes of creativity. But it also risks narrowing inquiry, dulling ambiguity, and replacing questions with answers. To embrace its potential without surrendering our agency, we must cultivate a new ethic—one that defends friction, reveres nuance, and protects the joy of wonder.
Thinking against the machine isn’t antagonism—it’s responsibility. It means reclaiming meaning from convenience, depth from fluency, and curiosity from automation. Machines may generate answers. But only we can decide which questions are still worth asking.
THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN BY AI AND EDITED BY INTELLICUREAN

Is the United States truly ready for the seismic shift in modern warfare—a transformation that The New Yorker‘s veteran war correspondent describes not as evolution but as rupture? In “Is the U.S. Ready for the Next War?” (July 14, 2025), Dexter Filkins captures this tectonic realignment through a mosaic of battlefield reportage, strategic insight, and ethical reflection. His central thesis is both urgent and unsettling: that America, long mythologized for its martial supremacy, is culturally and institutionally unprepared for the emerging realities of war. The enemy is no longer just a rival state but also time itself—conflict is being rewritten in code, and the old machines can no longer keep pace.
The piece opens with a gripping image: a Ukrainian drone factory producing a thousand airborne machines daily, each costing just $500. Improvised, nimble, and devastating, these drones have inflicted disproportionate damage on Russian forces. Their success signals a paradigm shift—conflict has moved from regiments to swarms, from steel to software. Yet the deeper concern is not merely technological; it is cultural. The article is less a call to arms than a call to reimagine. Victory in future wars, it suggests, will depend not on weaponry alone, but on judgment, agility, and a conscience fit for the digital age.
At the heart of the analysis lies a confrontation between two worldviews. On one side stands Silicon Valley—fast, improvisational, and software-driven. On the other: the Pentagon—layered, cautious, and locked in Cold War-era processes. One of the central figures is Palmer Luckey, the founder of the defense tech company Anduril, depicted as a symbol of insurgent innovation. Once a video game prodigy, he now leads teams designing autonomous weapons that can be manufactured as quickly as IKEA furniture and deployed without extensive oversight. His world thrives on rapid iteration, where warfare is treated like code—modular, scalable, and adaptive.
This approach clashes with the military’s entrenched bureaucracy. Procurement cycles stretch for years. Communication between service branches remains fractured. Even American ships and planes often operate on incompatible systems. A war simulation over Taiwan underscores this dysfunction: satellites failed to coordinate with aircraft, naval assets couldn’t link with space-based systems, and U.S. forces were paralyzed by their own institutional fragmentation. The problem wasn’t technology—it was organization.
What emerges is a portrait of a defense apparatus unable to act as a coherent whole. The fragmentation stems from a structure built for another era—one that now privileges process over flexibility. In contrast, adversaries operate with fluidity, leveraging technological agility as a force multiplier. Slowness, once a symptom of deliberation, has become a strategic liability.
The tension explored here is more than operational; it is civilizational. Can a democratic state tolerate the speed and autonomy now required in combat? Can institutions built for deliberation respond in milliseconds? These are not just questions of infrastructure, but of governance and identity. In the coming conflicts, latency may be lethal, and fragmentation fatal.
To frame the stakes, the essay draws on powerful historical precedents. Technological transformation has always arisen from moments of existential pressure: Prussia’s use of railways to reimagine logistics, the Gulf War’s precision missiles, and, most profoundly, the Manhattan Project. These were not the products of administrative order but of chaotic urgency, unleashed imagination, and institutional risk-taking.
During the Manhattan Project, multiple experimental paths were pursued simultaneously, protocols were bent, and innovation surged from competition. Today, however, America’s defense culture has shifted toward procedural conservatism. Risk is minimized; innovation is formalized. Bureaucracy may protect against error, but it also stifles the volatility that made American defense dynamic in the past.
This critique extends beyond the military. A broader cultural stagnation is implied: a nation that fears disruption more than defeat. If imagination is outsourced to private startups—entities beyond the reach of democratic accountability—strategic coherence may erode. Tactical agility cannot compensate for an atrophied civic center. The essay doesn’t argue for scrapping government institutions, but for reigniting their creative core. Defense must not only be efficient; it must be intellectually alive.
Perhaps the most haunting dimension of the essay lies in its treatment of ethics. As autonomous systems proliferate—from loitering drones to AI-driven targeting software—the space for human judgment begins to vanish. Some militaries, like Israel’s, still preserve a “human-in-the-loop” model where a person retains final authority. But this safeguard is fragile. The march toward autonomy is relentless.
The implications are grave. When decisions to kill are handed to algorithms trained on probability and sensor data, who bears responsibility? Engineers? Programmers? Military officers? The author references DeepMind’s Demis Hassabis, who warns of the ease with which powerful systems can be repurposed for malign ends. Yet the more chilling possibility is not malevolence, but moral atrophy: a world where judgment is no longer expected or practiced.
Combat, if rendered frictionless and remote, may also become civically invisible. Democratic oversight depends on consequence—and when warfare is managed through silent systems and distant screens, that consequence becomes harder to feel. A nation that no longer confronts the human cost of its defense decisions risks sliding into apathy. Autonomy may bring tactical superiority, but also ethical drift.
Throughout, the article avoids hysteria, opting instead for measured reflection. Its central moral question is timeless: Can conscience survive velocity? In wars of machines, will there still be room for the deliberation that defines democratic life?
The closing argument is not tactical, but philosophical. Readiness, the essay insists, must be measured not just by stockpiles or software, but by the moral posture of a society—its ability to govern the tools it creates. Military power divorced from democratic deliberation is not strength, but fragility. Supremacy must be earned anew, through foresight, imagination, and accountability.
The challenge ahead is not just to match adversaries in drones or data, but to uphold the principles that give those tools meaning. Institutions must be built to respond, but also to reflect. Weapons must be precise—but judgment must be present. The republic’s defense must operate at the speed of code while staying rooted in the values of a self-governing people.
The author leaves us with a final provocation: The future will not wait for consensus—but neither can it be left to systems that have forgotten how to ask questions. In this, his work becomes less a study in strategy than a meditation on civic responsibility. The real arsenal is not material—it is ethical. And readiness begins not in the factories of drones, but in the minds that decide when and why to use them.
THIS ESSAY REVIEW WAS WRITTEN BY AI AND EDITED BY INTELLICUREAN.
In the July 11, 2025 episode of Bloomberg Law’s Weekend Law podcast, the spotlight turned to the Supreme Court and one of the most urgent constitutional questions of the present era: can the federal government deny citizenship to children born in the United States based solely on their parents’ immigration status?
At the center of the discussion was a new executive order issued by the Trump administration. The order aims to withhold automatic citizenship from children born to undocumented immigrants. In response, a federal judge in New Hampshire has not only issued a temporary nationwide block on the order but also certified a class-action lawsuit that could have sweeping implications.

This development, as legal analyst and former DOJ official Leon Fresco explained, is not merely procedural—it is strategic. The case, still in its early stages, may force the Supreme Court to revisit the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause.
Fresco’s key insight concerned how litigants are adapting to recent changes in judicial thinking. After the Supreme Court expressed skepticism toward broad nationwide injunctions, many believed such tools were effectively dead. But Fresco pointed out that class-action certification remains a viable, and perhaps more precise, alternative.
The New Hampshire judge’s ruling created a nationwide class of plaintiffs: all children born on or after February 20, 2025, to parents who are either unlawfully present or not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. The judge carefully excluded parents from the class, narrowing the focus to the children’s citizenship claims. This move strengthens the class’s legal position, emphasizing a uniform constitutional harm.
Fresco characterized this approach as both narrow in structure and expansive in effect. By building the case around a specific constitutional injury—the denial of citizenship by birth—the lawsuit avoids the kinds of inconsistencies that often weaken broader claims.
At the heart of the dispute lies the interpretation of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.”
For over a century, the courts have understood this to include virtually everyone born on U.S. soil, with only narrow exceptions. The Trump administration’s order proposes a reinterpretation—arguing that undocumented immigrants and their children are not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States in the full constitutional sense.
This argument is novel, but not entirely new. Versions of it have circulated in fringe legal circles for years. What is new is the attempt to enforce this interpretation through executive power. If allowed to stand, it would mark a major departure from long-established constitutional norms.
Fresco raised a more immediate concern: that the Supreme Court may avoid ruling on the merits of the case altogether—at least for now. The Court, he warned, might grant a temporary stay that would allow the executive order to take effect while the lawsuit works its way through the lower courts.
This would mirror a pattern seen in other immigration cases, such as those involving Temporary Protected Status and humanitarian parole, where short procedural rulings allowed sweeping policy shifts without a full constitutional review.
The danger of such a stay is not theoretical. If the executive order goes into effect, children born under it would enter legal limbo. Denied citizenship, they would lack basic documents and protections. Challenging their status later could take years—possibly decades. In this way, even a temporary policy can create permanent consequences.
A central theme of the podcast segment was the evolving role of the judiciary in overseeing executive actions. Fresco questioned how the Court could reject a class-action lawsuit like this one without also undermining the logic that allows nationwide relief in other types of cases—such as defective products that cause uniform harm across the country.
If the courts are willing to permit class certification for consumer safety, why would they deny it in a case concerning citizenship—a matter of constitutional identity?
Fresco’s analogy was sharp: the law allows national class actions over faulty cribs or pharmaceuticals; why not over a birthright denied?
His point revealed the tension between procedural restraint and constitutional responsibility. If the Court is serious about limiting nationwide injunctions, it must offer a consistent, principled rationale for where it draws the line.
Toward the end of the discussion, Fresco referenced former Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, who has speculated that the Supreme Court may simply lack the votes to strike down the executive order directly. That possibility may explain the Court’s hesitancy to take up the issue.
Justice Neil Gorsuch’s past remarks—asking how the Court might “get to the merits fast”—suggest at least some justices recognize the urgency. But urgency does not always lead to clarity. If the Court allows the order to take effect temporarily, and then delays review, it could set in motion changes that are difficult to reverse.
In effect, the Court would be allowing the executive branch to reshape constitutional practice through interim decisions. That prospect, Fresco warned, is not only legally unstable but socially volatile.
Ultimately, what this case asks is not only a legal question but a civic one: Is citizenship a stable constitutional right, or can it be redefined by policy?
The class-action strategy now moving through the courts offers one possible defense: a method of forcing judicial engagement by focusing on clear constitutional harm and avoiding broad, unwieldy claims. It is, in Fresco’s words, an effort to meet the Court on its own procedural terms.
Yet the deeper conflict remains. The very idea of birthright citizenship—once considered legally untouchable—is now on trial. Whether the courts decide quickly or delay, the consequences will be lasting.
The Bloomberg Law discussion offered more than a legal update. It revealed how quickly constitutional assumptions can be unsettled—and how creative legal strategies are now being used to hold the line.
The New Hampshire ruling, and the class it created, represent a new phase in this fight. Narrow in scope but vast in significance, the lawsuit calls on the judiciary to answer directly: Is a child born on U.S. soil a citizen, or not?
In that answer lies the future of constitutional meaning—and the measure of whether the law remains anchored to principle, or drifts with the political tide.
THIS ESSAY AND REVIEW WAS WRITTEN BY AI AND EDITED BY INTELLICUREAN

The following essay was written by AI and edited by Intellicurean:
One often hears that art is a refuge from the storm, a quaint hermitage for the sensitive soul. But when the storm is a veritable tempest of tyranny, what then? Must beauty shrink to a whispered metaphor, or can it, with a flourish, confront the grotesque, form itself a weapon, and memory its shield?

Peter Weiss, the German-Swedish playwright and novelist, perhaps best known for his provocative Marat/Sade, offers an unflinching answer in his masterwork, The Aesthetics of Resistance. This three-volume novel—published between 1975 and 1981, and only recently fully translated into English by Joel Scott for Verso Books—presents not merely a chronicle of Europe’s descent into fascism, but an audacious theory of survival, contemplation, and rebellion through the very act of art.
In a perceptive recent essay for Liberties Journal, Jared Marcel Pollen explores the novel’s radical scope, elegantly correcting a common misattribution of a pivotal political aphorism. Not Lenin, but Maxim Gorky, Pollen reveals, claimed that “aesthetics was [his] ethics—the ethics of the future.” More than a mere historical footnote, this elegantly salvaged reversal encapsulates the novel’s very governing spirit: that beauty, far from being a retreat from political crisis, is its very precondition for meaning, that art does not merely ornament truth, but, with a surgical precision, it excavates it.
The Aesthetics of Resistance unfolds in the shadow of Europe’s unraveling, commencing in 1937, as Hitler consolidates power and Stalin’s purges silence dissent. The narrative spans the years up to 1942—a period that Hannah Arendt once called “midnight in the century.” But unlike conventional historical fiction, Weiss offers no linear tale of protagonists moving toward neat resolution. Instead, he crafts a philosophical Hades-wanderung—a relentless descent through betrayal, failed revolutions, ideological fracture, and the wreckage of cultural inheritance.
The text itself resists easy consumption. Its dense, paragraphless pages—walls of syntax without clear beginning or end—mirror the labyrinthine realities its characters inhabit. In an interview with The New York Times, translator Joel Scott remarked that reading Weiss is like “being submerged in consciousness,” and likened the novel’s structure to a frieze: a continuous mural of intellect, grief, and memory. This relentless, frieze-like form compels the reader to engage with history not as a series of discrete events, but as an overwhelming, cumulative force, a continuous present of trauma and resistance. The novel is as much a meditation on how we perceive history as it is on history itself.
At its core, The Aesthetics of Resistance is a Bildungsroman—a novel of education and formation. But it defiantly eschews the genre’s traditional bourgeois framework. This is no Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister or Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus spiraling through self-inquiry in cloistered academic halls. Weiss’s narrator—working-class, gentile, unnamed—does not wander through elite libraries or university quads. Instead, he and his comrades read Dante, study Greek sculpture, and debate Marxist theory in factory basements and kitchens, under constant threat of arrest or worse.
This autodidacticism—the practice of self-teaching—is not a mere supplement to formal education but a radical replacement. The narrator declares early on: “Our most important goal was to conquer an education… by using any means, cunning and strength of mind.” Their knowledge is not earned; it is stolen—like Promethean fire—from the guarded sanctums of official culture. This echoes Friedrich Schiller’s view in On the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795) that beauty cultivates moral freedom, acting as a safeguard against the dehumanizing mechanisms of state power. Indeed, in a totalitarian state that mutilates truth and simplifies human experience, the very act of preserving intellectual complexity – a core tenet of Weiss’s autodidacts – becomes, as Susan Sontag argued in “On Style,” an ethical stance in itself, an insistence on the primacy of certain values. In Weiss’s hands, this ethic becomes urgently, tragically manifest.
The profound question that animates Weiss’s project is not simply how to survive violence, but how to perceive it. What happens to art, to the very faculty of perception, when the world collapses into brutality? One compelling answer emerges in the novel’s early scene at the Pergamon Altar, a Hellenistic frieze of the Gigantomachy—a mythic war between gods and giants—housed in Berlin’s museum. As Nazi banners flutter outside, the young resisters look upon this magnificent fragment of antiquity and see not quaint myth, but relentless struggle. They interpret the contorted figures as symbols of class war, reclaiming the altar from its imminent fascist cooptation.
This interpretive act—the deliberate reading “against the grain”—is both aesthetic and political, a defiant reconstitution of meaning. It echoes Walter Benjamin’s chilling thesis that “there is no document of civilization that is not at the same time a document of barbarism.” Indeed, as Pollen writes with chilling precision, the Nazis, in their grotesque appropriation of classical forms, hollowed them into “plaster emptiness.” Weiss’s characters do the opposite: they revive these ancient forms by placing them in urgent dialogue with their own suffering, thus universalizing the struggle against domination, making the “mass of stone” a value “belonging to anyone who steps in front of it.”
The novel closes with a powerful meditation on Picasso’s Guernica, his monumental canvas depicting the bombing of the Basque town in 1937. The painting, the narrator insists, does not merely show war—it registers “an assault on the ability to express things.” Guernica marks a new kind of aesthetic task: not only must art represent horror, it must endure it. The painting outlasts its own referent, becoming what philosopher Elaine Scarry once called “a durable object,” an artifact that shelters memory and meaning long after political systems fall and the bombs cease to drop. In Alfonso Cuarón’s bleakly prescient dystopian film Children of Men (2006), Guernica appears, almost unnoticed, in the sterile interior of a government building—a poignant token of lost humanity. This, precisely, is Weiss’s abiding fear: that without the active labor of interpretation, without the human will to engage, even the greatest artistic achievements become mere decor, robbed of their subversive potential.
Some may, of course, recoil, finding The Aesthetics of Resistance too cerebral, too demanding, perhaps even too… Germanic, to resonate beyond the intellectual class. It’s a fair, if somewhat lazy, concern. And yet, as Timothy Snyder so chillingly reminds us in On Tyranny, fascism thrives precisely when the imagination is starved—when complexity gives way to cliché, when memory is replaced by manufactured myth.
Weiss’s project is a counteroffensive. His characters repeatedly ask, with desperate sincerity: “What does the Divina Commedia have to do with our lives?” In posing the question, they model the very activity the novel enacts—bridging distant beauty with present suffering. As Pollen notes, Weiss is not proposing simplistic analogies between then and now, but calling us to maintain the capacity for analogy—the capacity to perceive echoes and derive moral relevance from history, an imaginative act in itself.
Art, then, is not escapism. It is a form of mnemonic defense, a profound act of spiritual preservation. Horst Heilmann, a real historical figure and one of the novel’s central martyrs, declares: “All art… all literature are present inside ourselves, under the aegis of the only deity we can believe in—Mnemosyne”—Memory, mother of the Muses. Here Weiss evokes a stunning theological shift: divinity no longer lies in revelation, but in remembrance. Not in salvation, but in reckoning. Weiss shares this ethos with writers like W.G. Sebald and Toni Morrison, both of whom insisted that literature’s task is not to uplift, but to testify. In her Nobel lecture, Morrison described language as “the measure of our lives,” and warned that its decay is the first sign of cultural amnesia. Weiss anticipates this danger, and his novel becomes a fortress of form against forgetting.
Perhaps the greatest gauntlet Weiss throws down, the element that still most sharply divides critics, is his distinctive style. The novel’s paragraphs can stretch for pages. There is no chapter division, no conventional dialogue, and barely a linear plot. But this excess is deliberate. As George Steiner observed in The New Yorker, Weiss “wanted his novel to resist readability as a form of moral laziness.” This is not to suggest the novel is obscure for its own sake, a mere affectation of difficulty. Rather, its very form embodies its thesis: the reader’s discomfort, the laborious trek through its unbroken syntax, becomes an echo of the characters’ own relentless, desperate struggle for meaning amidst chaos. Like Thomas Bernhard, whose relentless monologic fury shapes Correction and Extinction, Weiss denies literary comfort. Instead, he offers friction, density, and dissonance—qualities perfectly befitting a narrative of clandestine, underground resistance, where truth arrives not through effortless clarity but through sheer, unyielding persistence. In his study The Work of Literature, philosopher Peter Szondi described literature as a form that must “carry contradiction inside itself.” Weiss takes this principle further: contradiction is not a flaw but a crucial feature of truly resistant art. The reader’s discomfort, then, is the novel’s ethical demand.
Weiss died in 1982, a year after completing his trilogy. In a rare interview that year with Der Spiegel, he confessed that his greatest fear was not censorship but irrelevance—that art would become mute in the face of spectacle. That fear feels chillingly prescient. As Western democracies flirt again with the seductive sirens of authoritarianism, and as history is re-scripted by those who profit from collective forgetting, The Aesthetics of Resistance emerges not merely as literature but as an instruction manual for endurance.
Its lessons are not limited to Germany or the 1930s. They resonate in Chile’s brutal reckoning with Pinochet, in the defiant murals of Belfast, in the urgent poetry of Mahmoud Darwish, and in the resolute chants of Tehran’s women today. Where brutality seeks silence, art insists on form—on surviving and shaping what was meant to be annihilated.
Weiss leaves us with a final, searing proposition: Imagination lives as long as resistance lives. And when resistance ends—when truth is reduced to slogan, when memory collapses into myth—then imagination, too, begins to die. But while a single reader still labors through his walls of text, still stands before the Pergamon frieze and refuses to see mere stone, Weiss’s profound vision endures. This is the essence of The Aesthetics of Resistance: not to comfort, but to compel. Not to promise victory, but to remind us that moral clarity comes not from slogans, but from study. And that to understand the past is not merely to remember—it is, in the most profound sense, to resist the future that forgets it.


The following essay review was written by AI and edited by Intellicurean from a New Yorker article titled “4.6 Billion Years On, The Sun Is Having A Moment”, by Bill McKibben from his forthcoming book “Here Comes The Sun”.
Much like a seasoned playgoer at a modern drama, we find ourselves watching the improbable and the inevitable perform a dizzying pas de deux. For decades, renewable energy existed on the fringe—a topic for earnest environmentalists, academic dreamers, and early adopters armed with more zeal than capital. One recalls the almost quaint marvel of the first all-solar house at the University of Delaware in 1973, drawing curious crowds like pilgrims to a modern oracle. It was a novelty, an “alternative” to the fossil-fueled behemoth that powered Western economies for two centuries. And “alternative” was the key word—suggesting not a contender, but a polite afterthought.
Yet as we move through the mid-2020s, a stunning twist has unfolded, largely unnoticed amid louder headlines. With little fanfare, renewable energy has shifted from a peripheral ideal to a mainstream economic reality. In a world often held hostage to political drama and climate paralysis, this shift—documented in a recent New Yorker piece drawn from Bill McKibben’s forthcoming book, Here Comes the Sun: A Last Chance for the Climate and a Fresh Chance for Civilization (August 2025)—feels both miraculous and overdue. What was once “too good to be true” is now simply true. Solar, wind, and battery storage have become the most cost-efficient, fastest-growing power sources on Earth. The implications are nothing short of a new Industrial Revolution—only this time, it’s clean, decentralized, and increasingly democratic.
The statistics McKibben explores in the excerpted material are not dry metrics—they’re signals of an epochal shift. It took nearly seventy years from the invention of the photovoltaic cell in 1954 to reach the first terawatt of installed solar power by 2022. The second terawatt arrived by 2024. The third? Expected by 2026. Solar is now being added at a rate of one gigawatt—equivalent to a coal plant—every fifteen hours. Wind power, a cousin to solar in its dependence on planetary physics, isn’t far behind.
Globally, renewables met 96% of new electricity demand in the past year. In the U.S., the figure was 93%. Fossil fuels, once the uncontested monarchs of modernity, are losing their crown. In March, for the first time, fossil fuels generated less than half of all U.S. electricity.
California provides a dramatic case study. In May, the state—now the fourth-largest economy in the world—hit a record: renewable sources produced 158% of its power demand. Over the entire day, they delivered 82% of electricity consumed. This wasn’t theoretical progress—it was operational proof.
Equally revolutionary is the rise of energy storage. Battery deployment has surged 76% this year alone. These systems often act as California’s overnight power source, stabilizing the grid when sunlight fades or wind slows. One official from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation noted, “batteries can smooth out some of that variability from those times when the wind isn’t blowing or the sun isn’t shining.” The result? California now uses 40% less natural gas than it did just last year—a number McKibben hails as “the single most hopeful statistic I’ve seen in four decades of writing about the climate crisis.”
Even Texas, synonymous with oil and gas, is rapidly rebranding its energy identity. In March, it set records for solar, wind, and battery output. During a brutal May heatwave, over a quarter of its power came from renewables. By adding 10,000 megawatts of clean capacity, Texas slashed emergency blackout risk from 16% last year to less than 1% now. This isn’t green idealism—it’s grid-level, boots-on-the-ground practicality.
But the scale of change in the U.S. pales in comparison to what’s happening in China. More than half the world’s renewables and batteries are now installed within Chinese borders. In May alone, China added 93 gigawatts of solar—equivalent to one gigawatt every eight hours. The environmental payoff is immediate: carbon emissions dropped in the first quarter of 2025, with electricity-linked emissions falling nearly 6% as solar and wind displaced coal. Nearly half of all vehicles sold in China this year were electric or hybrid.
This trend isn’t isolated—it’s contagious. South America, once planning 15 new coal plants, now plans none. India’s solar output surged so rapidly in early 2025 that coal consumption plateaued while natural gas use fell by a quarter. Even Poland, long a coal bastion, saw solar outstrip coal in May. These aren’t anomalies—they’re geopolitical rewrites.
And why? Because solar is now the cheapest, fastest path to power. China’s relentless innovation has driven battery costs down by 95% in 15 years. In just the first half of 2024, the U.S. alone added 4 gigawatts of storage. A Chinese utility’s latest bidding round cut prices by another 30%. Grid-scale batteries now power entire cities for hours. Nations that ignore this transformation aren’t just polluting—they’re rendering themselves globally uncompetitive.
Even petro-states have noticed. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE are all building massive solar fields. Their goal? 50% of electricity from solar by 2050. When oil empires go solar, the narrative has changed.
As with all revolutions, hindsight exposes how blind the experts were. In 2009, the International Energy Agency predicted 244 gigawatts of solar by 2030. That benchmark was reached by 2015. Their forecasts over the last decade missed by an average of 235%. The only group that got it close? Greenpeace.
Jenny Chase of Bloomberg, quoted in the book, admitted: “If you’d told me nearly 20 years ago what would be the case now… I would have laughed in your face.” The contrast between establishment analysts and environmentalists makes for a satisfying, if sobering, moment of vindication.
Perhaps the most radical reordering is happening in places least expected. In Pakistan, widespread solar adoption is quietly displacing national grid demand—not from recession, but from progress. Diesel sales are down 30%. Corn farmers now gift solar inverters as wedding dowries. Panels are laid flat on the earth without costly mounts. DIY TikTok tutorials fill the role of training programs. This is grassroots ingenuity—climate transition as community-driven liberation.
A similar story is emerging across Africa. In Namibia and Eswatini, rooftop solar accounts for 11–15% of peak electricity. In South Africa, small-scale solar now contributes nearly 20% of national grid capacity. Many of these systems go unreported, installed informally by citizens weary of blackouts. As energy analyst Joel Nana puts it: “This is happening anyway, whether you like it or not.”
What of minerals? What of land? These limits, once feared fatal, now seem manageable.
Lithium, long considered a bottleneck, has seen prices drop even as demand rises. New sources have been discovered. More importantly, recycling systems are maturing. A 2023 Energy Transitions Commission report found that all materials needed to reach net zero by 2050 amount to less than the coal burned in a single year. Battery tech is also becoming more efficient—using less lithium, less silver, and recovering more materials post-use. One roof of solar panels can now power ten replacements over 25 years. That’s not just sustainability—it’s a virtuous cycle.
Land, too, is more abundant than assumed. Rooftops and parking lots help, but a more powerful solution lies in reclaiming farmland used for ethanol. A single acre of solar produces as much energy as 100 acres of corn-based ethanol. Cornell researchers found that converting under half of U.S. ethanol fields could decarbonize the entire grid by 2050. That’s not fantasy. That’s arithmetic.
The obstacles now aren’t technical—they’re political. Thousands of renewable projects are stuck in “interconnection queues,” awaiting utility approval. The Biden Administration has taken steps to clear these logjams. But the Trump Administration is actively trying to reverse course, propping up coal and gas, and demonizing renewables. One appointee—formerly a fracking executive—labeled solar “a parasite on the grid.” That’s not science. That’s theater.
Ironically, such obstruction may accelerate the global transition. Nations are increasingly wary of U.S. energy instability and looking elsewhere. Wall Street sees the trend clearly: renewables are not just climate solutions, but hedges against geopolitical volatility. A 2023 global poll found that 68% of people support solar energy—five times more than fossil fuels. Even among likely Trump voters, 87% support clean energy tax credits. The political class may dither, but the public is marching forward.
The most profound feature of this transition may be its structure. Fossil fuels are scarce, located in select pockets, and easy to monopolize. But solar and wind are everywhere. You can’t own the sun. You can’t weaponize the wind. What this means geopolitically is staggering. Wars have been fought over oil. No one’s going to invade for sunshine.
And that’s the quiet promise of this revolution. Decentralized power doesn’t just decarbonize economies—it redistributes agency. It empowers individuals, communities, and nations to unshackle themselves from legacy dependencies.
Paradigm shifts of this magnitude—the Industrial Revolution, the rise of computing—rarely announce themselves with fireworks. But when they arrive, they redefine everything.
The insights drawn from McKibben’s forthcoming book deliver that quiet shock. What emerges is not speculation, but evidence. A meticulously documented, unapologetically optimistic vision of a world poised on the edge of salvation—not by hope alone, but by hard math, falling prices, and widespread will.
The sun, it seems, is not merely rising. It is conquering.
The following essay is AI -generated, edited by Intellicurean, as part of our “The Cynic & The Dandy” series, of an interview article published on July 6, 2025 on the Toynbee Prize Foundation website titled Hayek’s Bastards and the Global Origins of the Far Right: An Interview with Quinn Slobodian.

One finds oneself, much like a seasoned playgoer observing a particularly convoluted modern drama, grappling with the profound complexities of our age. The curtain, it seems, has risen on “Trump 2.0,” a performance so bewildering in its contradictions that even the most astute critics of human folly might pause for breath. This curious administration simultaneously seeks to disentangle itself from global commitments while igniting fresh international disputes; it endeavours to depreciate the dollar to boost exports whilst clinging to its status as the world’s reserve currency; and it champions a reduction in global economic reliance while striving to unilaterally dictate global economic terms. The American colossus, one might observe, appears caught in a most perplexing dance with its own identity, and the global audience watches, utterly transfixed.
It is into this very contemporary conundrum that Quinn Slobodian, a historian of capitalism whose intellectual acuity is as sharp as a well-honed epigram, strides with his latest volume: Hayek’s Bastards: Race, Gold, IQ, and the Capitalism of the Far Right (Princeton University Press, 2025). This title, one must concede, possesses a certain Wildean flourish, hinting at the delightful audacity within its pages. Slobodian, with the keen eye of a diagnostician, posits that the apparent contradiction of the Far Right simultaneously embracing pro-market liberalism and social hierarchies – facilitating the free movement of capital but not of people – is, in fact, no contradiction at all. He argues that neoliberalism has always possessed the intellectual elasticity to accommodate such a narrative.
Slobodian’s current work builds upon his earlier seminal analyses in Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Harvard University Press, 2018) and Crack-up Capitalism: Market Radicals and the Dream of a World Without Democracy (Metropolitan, 2023). However, Hayek’s Bastards shifts its chronological focus decisively to the 1990s, illuminating this pivotal decade through the lens of figures not previously central to his explorations. If Globalists dissected the intellectual elite of the Mont Pèlerin Society, and Crack-Up Capitalism examined market radicals within the broader globalisation context, this new work turns its penetrating gaze to paleo-libertarianism. This intriguing ideological fusion, combining libertarian disdain for global governance with paleo-conservative traditionalism and isolationism (a distinct contrast to the more recent neoconservative branch of the Republican Party), forms the crux of Slobodian’s argument.
At the heart of Slobodian’s contention lies a startling conclusion: the rise of the Far Right is an acceleration, not a rejection of capitalism; a frontlash, not a backlash. He meticulously demonstrates how right-wing libertarians of the 1990s, through their convergence with paleoconservatives and their burgeoning interest in biology, IQ, and gold, inadvertently laid the intellectual foundations for our present reality.
In a recent conversation with Asensio Robles of Comillas Pontifical University, Slobodian elucidated the two primary concepts underpinning his book. The notion of “bastards,” he explains, serves as a vivid metaphor for the generations of intellectual influence, where adherents, though inspired by mentors, may diverge significantly from the original spirit and content of their masters’ work. In the case of Friedrich Hayek, Slobodian points to those who, in their pursuit of his scientific and complexity-focused ideas, veered into domains such as scientific racism or the belief in human nature as an absolute organizing principle. These, Slobodian asserts, represent the “illegitimate” heirs who strayed far enough to betray Hayek’s fundamental principles.
Friedrich Hayek, a Nobel laureate in Economics (1974) and a leading figure of the Austrian School of economics, is perhaps best known for his fervent defense of free-market capitalism and his critiques of central planning, notably articulated in his seminal 1944 work, The Road to Serfdom. Hayek argued that economic coordination arises not from central design, but from a “spontaneous order” – the result of millions of individuals making decisions based on dispersed, localized knowledge communicated primarily through the price system. He believed that any attempt by the state to centrally plan the economy would inevitably lead to a loss of individual liberty and, ultimately, totalitarianism, because such planners could never possess the vast, tacit knowledge embedded within a decentralized market.
The second crucial concept is “Volk capital.” Slobodian critiques the common, overly generalized understanding of neoliberalism as simply advocating for the commodification of all things and the reduction of all humans to an interchangeable substance. By adopting a narrower, more historically precise definition, focusing on a discrete group of thinkers (including those within the Mont Pèlerin Society, which Hayek co-founded in 1947), he reveals a significant inflection point in the 1960s and 1970s. This period saw a shift in neoliberal thought towards an emphasis on human difference, rather than equality.
Slobodian argues that the universalizing concept of human capital became “re-grounded” in specific genetic populations or cultural groups. He observes the re-emergence of 19th-century notions of the “Volk”—the idea of an essential character of a kinship group—fused with economic categories. This, he contends, transforms “human capital” into “Volk capital,” demonstrating how an ideology often associated with abstract market principles could regress to antiquated distinctions. For instance, by the 1980s, Hayek himself, often considered a progenitor of neoliberalism, suggested a unique quality of the Western world in producing an “optimal economic actor.”
Slobodian further clarifies the genesis of these two books, revealing they were initially conceived as a single grand volume. The political shocks of 2016-2017 – the election of Donald Trump, the Brexit “Leave” vote, and the rise of parties like Alternative for Germany – prompted his inquiry. He expresses dissatisfaction with mainstream interpretations that viewed these developments as a revolt against neoliberal capitalism by those “left behind” by globalisation. This narrative, he argues, incorrectly positioned figures like Trump and Boris Johnson as unexpected challengers to the neoliberal consensus.
To counter this, Slobodian first introduced the concept of the “zone” in Crack-up Capitalism. This refers to more fluid spaces for investor capital within nations, such as freeports in the United Kingdom or the proliferation of Special Economic Zones in countries like China and India. He notes that in 2017-2018, much of the apparent economic nationalism was, in fact, about creating these spaces for capital mobility. For example, as of 2023, there were over 7,000 Special Economic Zones globally, employing tens of millions of people and contributing significantly to trade and investment, illustrating this practical application of “zones.”
He then sought to integrate the observation that many within the alt-right in 2016 originated from the paleo-libertarian camp. These individuals, skeptical of both global and national governments, sought a fracturing of the state system. The “grand narrative” of bundling these ideas proved “quixotic,” leading to the separate publication of Crack-up Capitalism and Hayek’s Bastards, the latter focusing on the paleo-alliance between dissident right-wing figures and the neoliberal movement.
The chronological alignment between the two books is evident. In Hayek’s Bastards, the post-Cold War period is presented as a moment of reckoning for neoliberals, who questioned whether they had truly “won” or if “state spending and socialism” persisted in new guises, such as environmentalism or feminism. Similarly, in Crack-up Capitalism, the 1990s marked a breakthrough for zones, representing a form of globalisation that fostered “diversities across territory” rather than uniform regulatory spaces. The fundamental thread uniting both narratives, Slobodian suggests, is the “use of difference, politically or economically.” This challenges the widely held assumption that the 1990s and 2000s were periods of increasing uniformity, arguing instead that they were also times when “irreconcilable differences” were intensified and leveraged for new political agendas.
Slobodian also tackles the pervasive assumption that neoliberalism is solely a celebration of individualism. He argues that while individualism is indeed a focus, neoliberals are intensely concerned with the conditions under which it can be realized. When the traditional “republican tradition” – based on an impartial state providing space for individual expression – is discarded, a new framework for community must be forged. This is particularly true for the “subgenre of neoliberal thought” that advocates for the dissolution of the state.
In this context, the necessity arises to constitute communities that can function and allow for individual expression without uniform regulations from a representative state. This leads to an interest in factors like the role of ethnic homogeneity in decreasing transaction costs and fostering trust, thereby allowing communities to self-perpetuate. It also involves examining the importance of the “social contract” as a literal set of terms for participation in smaller communities, and questions of social reproduction – specifically, the necessary gender orders to ensure sufficient population in a “closed-border model of political organization.” This, he notes, is where anarcho-capitalists and conservatives find common ground, the former seeking abstract individual freedom but recognizing the need for parameters, and the latter striving to preserve existing moral and cultural orders.
A striking observation from Slobodian’s research is the neoliberal fear that the Cold War might have been “lost” despite the Soviet Union’s collapse, due to persistent high state spending. The end of the Cold War, Slobodian reveals, raised the possibility of completely dismantling the social state, which in turn brought forth new questions about how a post-redistributive order could be anchored. This, he asserts, directly relates to the current moment in the United States, where campaigns to significantly cut the federal budget, such as proposals to reduce it by one-third (as seen in certain fiscal proposals from conservative groups, often citing a need to return to pre-expansion levels of spending), would necessitate the dismantling of the existing social state. This scenario, he suggests, brings to mind the ominous question posed by Charles Murray regarding the aftermath of the welfare state’s disappearance – whether it would lead to anarchy, organic self-organization, or a segment of the population perishing. The “vexed triumphalism” following the Cold War, Slobodian concludes, thus set the stage for the “apocalyptic forms of politics” now all too familiar.
Slobodian highlights the remarkable absence of significant sectarian splits within neoliberalism between the 1940s and 1980s. The clear ideological battle lines drawn between the “free, liberal, capitalist” world and the “planned command economies” of the communist bloc maintained a cohesive front. However, with the abrupt erasure of this divide in the 1990s, two paths emerged: either assume inevitable global convergence and the end of meaningful political divisions, or contend that divisions persisted, merely migrating to previously overlooked domains. The global Right, he observes, opted for the latter.
The 1990s became a period of “restless search for a new enemy” for the Right. This sometimes involved resurrecting older tropes, such as the anti-Semitic portrayal of George Soros as a conspiratorial figure, a narrative prominently used by figures like Viktor Orbán. Neoliberals, too, participated in this search, ultimately identifying their new adversary in the Left’s “march through the institutions” – specifically, movements advocating for gender and racial equality and a “politically correct” discourse. Slobodian emphasizes that this framing of issues like affirmative action and state-led efforts to redress inequality began remarkably early – some 35 years ago. He argues that the Left, too focused on internal critiques of a more mainstream neoliberalism (like that associated with Bill Clinton or Barack Obama), was often “caught off guard” by the “disruptive politics of the last decade,” failing to recognize the emerging “villain” that would ultimately manifest in today’s culture wars.
Slobodian’s methodological approach, as noted by Robles, is characterized by his commitment to “reading against the grain.” He consistently challenges conventional wisdom: if neoliberalism is thought to strive for state dissolution, Globalists shows its reliance on state intervention; if it promotes a borderless society, Crack-up Capitalism highlights its attention to “human separation”; and if the alt-right is seen as a backlash, Hayek’s Bastards frames it as a “frontlash,” an acceleration of the ideology. This “counterintuitive position” is, for Slobodian, a means to explore the profound revelations found within such contradictions. His advice to students – to begin a paper with “We think it’s like this, but it’s actually like that, and I’m going to show you why” – underscores his dedication to empirical evidence and intellectual revision.
He also draws a strong correlation between the 1990s and the 1960s, suggesting that understanding paleo-libertarian interests in hard borders, IQ, and gold necessitates examining earlier debates surrounding the 1965 Immigration Act, 1960s evolutionary psychology, or monetary reform post-Bretton Woods. These two decades, both periods of relative prosperity, represented moments where attempts were made to reconfigure societal settlements. Slobodian contends that the Left’s focus on criticizing a “progressive neoliberalism” (e.g., of the Clinton or Obama era) that paid “lip service” to 1960s social movements while blunting their critical edge meant they were “caught off guard” in 2016. He suggests that identifying what neoliberals “worried about” in a given decade, such as environmental demands disrupting growth models in the 1970s and 1990s, could reveal “vulnerability in the economic system” and “soft spots” for counter-movements to exploit.
Regarding future inquiries, Robles points to the absence of cryptocurrencies and AI in Hayek’s Bastards. Slobodian confirms these will be explored in his forthcoming book, Muskism, co-authored with Ben Tarnoff, which will delve into AI, effective altruism, and superintelligence. This work is slated for release next year.
However, Slobodian maintains a critical stance on cryptocurrencies, viewing them as “parasitical on a functioning traditional monetary system” and primarily “a hedge-speculative asset” or “plaything for a small number of libertarians and more recently large investors.” He believes his skepticism has been “a wise bet,” as the number of “true believers” in blockchain as a political template remains small, with most investors using crypto like any other growth sector.
Intriguingly, Slobodian’s other new research direction looks not to the digital future, but to a historical “backward” step: the changes in the human sciences in the postwar decades, specifically “How humans became animals at Harvard.” This project will explore the world of figures like Richard Herrnstein (a student of B. F. Skinner) and E. O. Wilson in the 1960s and 1970s, examining how humans were increasingly “analogized to animals.”
In Hayek’s Bastards, Quinn Slobodian has, with surgical precision, woven a compelling and unsettling thread through the tapestry of intellectual history. He compels us to confront the uncomfortable truths about the origins of our present predicament, reminding us that the seemingly spontaneous outbursts of populism are, in fact, the meticulously cultivated fruits of a long and complex intellectual lineage. One leaves his analysis with a renewed sense of vigilance, a heightened awareness of the subtle, often insidious, ways in which ideas, like the most potent of poisons, can mutate and proliferate, shaping our world in ways we are only now beginning to comprehend. Indeed, the stage is set for future acts in this ongoing drama, and one eagerly awaits Slobodian’s next intellectual curtain call.
“The Cynic & The Dandy” is an AI-generated essay series based on a hypothetical collaboration between Oscar Wilde and George Bernard Shaw.

The following essay was written by ChatGPT, and edited by Intellicurean, through the creative filter of Oscar Wilde’s barbed wit and George Bernard Shaw’s moral seriousness, of a review of John Bellamy Foster’s “Albert Einstein’s ‘Why Socialism?’: The Enduring Legacy of His Classic Essay” as it would appear in an esteemed magazine or journal.
In an era where celebrity chatter often drowns out meaningful discourse—ephemeral as the pixels that transmit it—it is both refreshing and necessary to recall that Albert Einstein was not merely a demigod of science, floating above the affairs of humankind. He was a thinker with moral conviction and intellectual courage. John Bellamy Foster’s timely volume, Albert Einstein’s “Why Socialism?”: The Enduring Legacy of His Classic Essay (Monthly Review, July 2025), excavates an overlooked manifesto whose radical clarity remains provocatively undiminished by time.
More than seventy-five years have passed since Einstein contributed his essay Why Socialism? to the inaugural issue of Monthly Review in May 1949—right in the throes of America’s Red Scare. In that climate of ideological hysteria, even reason itself was suspect. Yet Einstein, with characteristic directness, named capitalism as the source of modern spiritual and economic malaise. “The economic anarchy of capitalist society,” he wrote, “is, in my opinion, the real source of the evil.”
This was no armchair abstraction. It was an act of moral and intellectual defiance in an era of conformity. Rather than tempering his critique to placate the political climate, Einstein diagnosed capitalism as a system that cripples the individual, erodes social cohesion, and mistakes profit for purpose. His socialism, then, was not bureaucratic dogma, but a humane vision: a call for solidarity, responsibility, and human dignity.
Foster’s introduction accomplishes three critical feats. First, it confirms Einstein’s consistent—if unfashionable—commitment to socialist ideals. Second, it situates Why Socialism? within a contemporary moment of deepening ecological and geopolitical crisis, not unlike the postwar anxieties Einstein addressed. Third, and most compellingly, Foster refuses to treat Einstein’s words as nostalgic artifacts. Instead, he reads them as instruments of moral interrogation for the present.
A powerful moment recounted in Foster’s commentary draws from a recently unearthed interview transcript titled, YES, ALBERT EINSTEIN WAS A SOCIALIST. In it, Einstein recounts a chilling conversation: a friend, contemplating nuclear annihilation, casually asks why Einstein is so concerned about humanity’s extinction. The question is as nihilistic as it is sincere—eerily prefiguring today’s fatalism disguised as realism.
Einstein’s response was telling. He saw this resignation not as philosophical sophistication, but as a symptom of capitalism’s emotional deadening. A world driven by profit, he argued, had alienated people not only from one another but from their very capacity to find joy. “The naive, simple and unsophisticated enjoyment of life,” he mourned, had become a casualty. The resulting solitude, he observed, was not noble introspection but a prison built of egotism and insecurity.
In Why Socialism?, Einstein extends this observation: “Man is, at one and the same time, a solitary being and a social being… As a social being, he seeks to gain the recognition and affection of his fellow human beings… and to improve their conditions of life.” The essay thus offers not just an economic critique, but a portrait of the spiritual crisis induced by capitalism.
Einstein did not envision socialism as the rigid apparatus of state control feared by his critics. Instead, he imagined a cultural and moral transformation—one that would replace competition with cooperation, and empty success with meaningful contribution. “In addition to promoting his own innate abilities,” he wrote, “education would attempt to develop in [the individual] a sense of responsibility for his fellow man in place of the glorification of power and success in our present society.”
This human-centered socialism bears more resemblance to George Bernard Shaw’s ethical idealism than to any centralized Leninist command structure. It’s a socialism that asks not only how society is organized, but what kind of people it produces.
Foster’s commentary reaches its most powerful moments when it highlights the relevance of Einstein’s critique in light of today’s contradictions. Technological progress has not delivered leisure or security—it has exacerbated anxiety. “The worker is constantly in fear of losing his job,” Einstein observed. “Technological progress frequently results in more unemployment rather than an easing of the burden of work for all.”
The implications are strikingly modern. The rise of AI, automation, and gig economies has done little to stabilize human life. Meanwhile, the grotesque spectacle of billionaires launching vanity rockets while basic needs go unmet seems to fulfill Einstein’s warning: “Private capital tends to become concentrated in few hands… at the expense of smaller ones.”
Einstein’s insights cut deeper than economics. He warned that unbridled competition produces “a huge waste of labor and… crippling of the social consciousness of individuals.” Foster echoes this, showing how the very mechanisms that promise efficiency often produce alienation and redundancy. In a world where millions remain hungry while supply chains overflow, the diagnosis of “planned chaos” is tragically apt.
To Foster’s credit, the book does not shy away from the difficulties of implementing socialism. It acknowledges Einstein’s own candor: that centralized systems can create new forms of domination. “How can the rights of the individual be protected,” he asked, “and therewith a democratic counterweight to the power of bureaucracy be assured?”
Foster does not offer easy answers, nor does he romanticize Einstein’s views. But what he recovers is the philosopher’s refusal to retreat into cynicism. Einstein, like Shaw, understood that history does not advance through comfort or caution. It advances through the courage to propose—and live by—dangerous ideals.
This moral clarity is what makes Why Socialism? enduring. In an era when capitalism insists that no alternatives exist, Einstein reminds us that alternatives are always possible—so long as we preserve the moral imagination to conceive them.
If one criticism can be leveled at Foster’s approach, it is that he leaves little room for ambiguity. This is no quiet meditation on gradual reform. It is a call to judgment. In a time when readers often seek the past as comfort, Foster compels us to read it as confrontation. The result is not a nostalgic ode to Einstein’s politics but a provocation: What kind of civilization do we want?
Einstein wrote, “I am convinced there is only one way to eliminate these grave evils, namely through the establishment of a socialist economy, accompanied by an educational system which would be oriented towards social goals.” The boldness of that sentence still stings in a society that treats cooperation as utopian and hoarding as genius.
Foster’s restraint is notable throughout—he avoids both hagiography and polemic. He invites the reader to wrestle with Einstein’s ideas, not worship them. The book’s greatest achievement is that it makes us take Einstein seriously—not just as a physicist, but as a moral thinker who challenged the logic of his time and, perhaps, still ours.
To read Why Socialism? in 2025 is to hear a still-resonant signal from a thinker who refused to let go of the future. Einstein’s socialism was never about bureaucracies—it was about the possibility of decency, of cooperation, of lives lived without fear. And if that vision sounds naive today, then perhaps the problem lies not in the vision, but in the world that has taught us to dismiss it.
As Foster’s book makes clear, the choice remains what it was in 1949: between solidarity and atomization, between a society built on care or one cannibalized by competition. It is, at bottom, a choice between life and extinction.
One imagines Einstein, ever the pragmatist with a poet’s soul, would have approved.


The following essay was written by ChatGPT and edited by Intellicurean from an article titled “The 20 best novels of all time” written by Claire Allfree and published in The Telegraph book section on July 6, 2025.
When a culture attempts to consecrate a definitive list of its greatest novels, it risks both an admirable arrogance and a kind of elegiac futility. The recent selection of The 20 Best Novels of All Time, published by The Telegraph, seems at once a celebration of the novel’s inexhaustible possibility and an implicit acknowledgment of our own waning capacity for reading with genuine urgency. It is as though we assemble these canons less to instruct our descendants than to reassure ourselves that we have not entirely forgotten how literature once moved the soul.
One cannot help but admire the breadth and seriousness of this catalogue. It stretches from the dreamlike elegance of The Tale of Genji—a work whose thousand-year distance intensifies its immediacy—to the compulsive self-dissection of Knausgaard’s My Struggle, a testament to our age’s faith that self-disclosure can substitute for narrative shape. What holds these disparate texts together is not merely their historical significance but their shared aspiration to render life in all its unmastered perplexity.
If Harold Bloom were to begin here, he might call attention to The Tale of Genji as an early demonstration of what he once termed the “internalization of romance.” It is a book that transcends its courtly gossip to become an inexhaustible study in desire’s transformations, a mirror to the reader’s own fluctuations of attachment and estrangement. We encounter Genji’s erotic restlessness as both scandalous and poignantly familiar, for the novel’s true subject is the incommensurability between longing and fulfillment—an incommensurability that modern fiction has inherited as its principal obsession.
James Wood, by contrast, might focus on Middlemarch as the novelistic apogee of moral realism. Eliot’s genius lay in her refusal to reduce her characters to mere emblems of ideology or historical process. Instead, she endowed them with what Wood has called “free indirect style’s psychic oscillation,” a prose capable of inhabiting and exposing consciousness in the same instant. It is a book that dares to be both panoramic and exquisitely local, to weigh the ambitions of a nation against the disappointments of a single marriage bed. If there is a single argument to be made for the continued relevance of the realist novel, it is that Middlemarch remains more acute about our interiority than any contemporary memoir.
And yet one cannot ignore how this list gestures toward the novel’s capacity for formal subversion. Ulysses, with its irreverent transformations of the Homeric epic into the trivial routines of Dublin, still feels scandalous in its abundance. Joyce’s genius is not only in his linguistic pyrotechnics but in his suspicion that consciousness itself can never be adequately represented. His prose, that shifting mosaic of styles and registers, offers no comfort to the reader who seeks transparency. Instead, it confronts us with the knowledge that the novel’s greatest power may reside in its refusal to cohere.
This refusal—to simplify, to console, to moralize—animates many of the twenty selections. Invisible Man is less a conventional narrative than a hallucinatory initiation into the American underworld of racial invisibility. Ellison’s rhetorical bravado, his blending of surrealism and jeremiad, still outpaces the efforts of more contemporary chroniclers of identity. To read Invisible Man today is to recognize how easily literary radicalism becomes cultural commonplace, but also to remember how singular its achievement remains.
Nor does the list shy from novels that embrace the uncanny. Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita may be the most exuberant refutation of realist pieties ever composed. Its supernatural comedy is both a rebuke to Stalinist orthodoxy and a reminder that the imagination is an inherently seditious faculty. If much of the 20th-century novel sought to dismantle the illusions of bourgeois life, Bulgakov’s masterpiece demonstrates that irony and enchantment can be revolutionary forces.
Yet if Bloom were to caution us, he would do so against the temptation to read these novels exclusively as instruments of social critique. Literature endures precisely because it exceeds its momentary political applications. War and Peace is indeed an anatomy of the Napoleonic Wars, but it is more crucially a demonstration of how historical consciousness itself can become an object of artistic inquiry. Tolstoy’s genius was to discover that the novelist’s truest fidelity is not to facts but to the felt perplexity of lived experience.
It is striking how Robinson Crusoe stands at the inception of the English novel, bearing within it the seeds of many later contradictions. Defoe’s narrative is, on the surface, a hymn to industry and resourcefulness. But the same story—of a man claiming dominion over an island—also encodes the imperial impulse, the confidence that the world exists to be measured, catalogued, and possessed. What once seemed the purest adventure has become, to modern readers, an uneasy parable of conquest.
One also encounters here the severe naturalism of Thérèse Raquin, a work whose lurid determinism feels almost an affront to Victorian piety. Zola’s lovers are not tragic in any redemptive sense; they are specimens trapped in an experiment of their own appetites. And yet there is a perverse grandeur in the novel’s refusal to pretend that desire leads anywhere but into the pit.
New Grub Street too is a novel about entrapment—this time not by passion but by commerce. Gissing’s weary chronicling of literary London feels uncannily prophetic, as if he anticipated the rise of every ghostwritten bestseller and every writer forced to commodify a persona. What is most unsettling is that he offers no counterexample: no heroic idealist who transcends the marketplace, no unspoiled domain of “pure” art. In this sense, the book remains an indispensable autopsy of cultural production.
If Zola and Gissing reveal the suffocating material conditions of life, Moby-Dick reveals the existential abyss. No novel is more saturated with the terror of cosmic indifference. Melville’s prose—sometimes biblical, sometimes madcap—collapses the distance between metaphysics and anatomy, making the whale not merely an animal but an emblem of the universe’s mute resistance to comprehension. In Bloom’s phrase, it is the American epic that devours all interpretations, a text that renders the critic humble before its incommensurate ambition.
One finds a different kind of ambition in Party Going, where Henry Green distills modernist unease into something almost glacial. Its stranded revellers, imprisoned in their own frivolity while fog swallows the city below, seem to embody an entire civilization’s failure to apprehend its own decline. The novel is both slight in incident and inexhaustible in implication—a reminder that the modernist fascination with stasis can be as provocative as any narrative pyrotechnics.
Proust’s In Search of Lost Time remains the most exhaustive testimony to literature’s faith in consciousness as a world unto itself. No novel before or since has so patiently mapped the minute inflections of memory, the subtle humiliations and triumphs of social life. It is a book that tests the limits of our attention but also rewards it with an intimacy that becomes, paradoxically, universal.
The Great Gatsby, meanwhile, retains its status as a parable of aspiration’s inevitable corrosion. Fitzgerald’s sentences are so lapidary that their loveliness can almost distract from the novel’s acrid judgment. Gatsby’s dream—at once romantic and predatory—has become the template for American self-mythology. That the dream collapses under the weight of its illusions is precisely what grants it the force of prophecy.
It is striking, too, how many of these novels seek to articulate the experience of cultures in collision. Things Fall Apart is the most lucid demonstration of Achebe’s conviction that narrative authority must be reclaimed by those whom empire has consigned to silence. Okonkwo’s tragedy is not only that he fails to adapt but that his story has been written over by the conqueror’s language. Achebe’s triumph is to create a form that both inhabits and transforms that language.
Closer to our own era, The Country Girls quietly ignited a literary insurrection. O’Brien’s candid portrayal of female desire and disillusionment, so scandalous in 1960s Ireland, now seems almost decorous in its gentleness. Yet its influence remains incalculable. It taught a generation of writers that the domestic could be radical, that the most private confessions might unsettle entire cultures.
No less ambitious, though in a different register, is The Golden Notebook. Lessing’s formal fragmentation enacts the very psychic disintegration it describes. Anna Wulf’s notebooks—political, personal, artistic—refuse to reconcile into any coherent identity. In this refusal, Lessing anticipates the confessional experiments of Knausgaard and the autofiction that now dominates so much literary discourse.
The Rings of Saturn, by W.G. Sebald, is a late testament to literature’s capacity to hover between genres—memoir, travelogue, essay—and to become, in that ambiguity, something more resonant than any of them alone. Sebald’s melancholy is not performative but almost geological: the sorrow of civilizations grinding into dust, of memory dissolving into rumor.
If Sebald writes out of mourning, Knausgaard writes out of a hunger so relentless it often seems pathological. My Struggle is both monument and provocation: an assertion that the granular details of ordinary life deserve the same attention Proust once gave to aristocratic salons. Whether this is a triumph of honesty or a capitulation to narcissism is a question the reader must answer alone.
And then there is Conversations with Friends, whose subdued prose and emotional diffidence reflect an era uneasy with grandeur. Rooney’s novel is not so much plotted as observed: a record of glancing attachments, tentative betrayals, and the provisional negotiations of millennial intimacy. Some will dismiss it as slight, but its cool detachment has a disquieting relevance. It suggests that the novel no longer needs epic ambition to be significant; it need only be exact.
A Closing Reflection
Surveying these twenty novels, we see not a single tradition but a plurality of experiments—each one extending the novel’s reach. To read them is to join a conversation that has never ended, in which each new book answers its predecessors with admiration, dissent, or surpassing ambition. Perhaps that is the most heartening lesson: that literature, in all its contradictions, remains the most durable form we possess for contemplating the inexhaustible strangeness of being alive.
A LIST OF THE BOOKS FROM THE ESSAY AND REVIEW IS BELOW:

The following is an in-depth analysis of President Trump’s “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” written by ChatGPT from important, bi-partisan fiscal, economic and political sources, all listed below:
If there is one unassailable truth in American political life, it is that no grand legislative gesture arrives without the promise of prosperity—and the prospect of unintended consequences. Donald Trump’s “One Big Beautiful Bill,” signed into law on July 4th, stands as a monument to this dynamic: a sprawling package of permanent tax cuts, entitlement retrenchments, and fresh spending, all wrapped in a populist bow and accompanied by the familiar refrain that the deficits will somehow pay for themselves.
To understand the bill’s import—and its likely fallout—it helps to consider three vantage points. The first is that of Milton Friedman, who would see in these provisions a laboratory for the free market, tempered by fiscal illusions. The second is Paul Krugman’s, for whom this is a brazen experiment in upward redistribution. The third is David Stockman’s, whose uniquely jaundiced eye discerns an unholy alliance of crony capitalism and debt-fueled political theatre.
Friedman, the Nobel laureate and evangelist of free enterprise, might first commend the bill’s unapologetic tax relief. A permanent extension of the 2017 tax cuts is precisely the sort of measure he once called “a way to restore incentives, reduce distortions, and reward enterprise.” For Friedman, a tax system ought to be predictable, broad-based, and minimally intrusive. In this sense, the bill’s elimination of taxes on tips and overtime income, coupled with higher thresholds for the estate tax, will likely increase the incentive to work, save, and invest.
Yet Friedman would be quick to warn that no tax cut exists in a vacuum. The real test of fiscal virtue, he always argued, is not in slashing tax rates but in restraining spending. This bill, by combining aggressive tax cuts with continued defense expansions and only partial reductions to social spending, falls short of the discipline he prescribed. The result, Friedman would say, is a structural deficit that will eventually require either inflation or future tax hikes. “There is no such thing as a free lunch,” he liked to remind audiences. This is a lunch billed to generations unborn.
Krugman, viewing the same legislation, would perceive not a triumph of market freedom but an egregious abdication of public responsibility. He has long argued that the most misleading idea in modern politics is the notion that tax cuts inevitably pay for themselves. As the Congressional Budget Office’s scoring shows, the bill is likely to add over $3 trillion to the national debt in the next decade, even after accounting for higher GDP. Krugman would note that the permanent nature of the cuts deprives lawmakers of future leverage and crowds out investments in education, infrastructure, and health.
More pointedly, Krugman would argue that the bill’s distributional impact is regressive by design. Expanded deductions for capital gains and estates, the restoration of a higher SALT cap, and corporate incentives all tilt the benefits toward the affluent, while Medicaid cuts and SNAP work requirements fall hardest on those with the least. In Krugman’s view, this is not simply poor economics but a moral failing: a return to what he calls “the era of Dickensian inequality, dressed up in the rhetoric of growth.”
Yet the critique most likely to sting is the one that David Stockman would deliver. Unlike Krugman, Stockman began as a champion of supply-side tax reform. But he has since become its most unflinching critic. To him, the “Big Beautiful Bill” represents the final stage of a fiscal derangement decades in the making: a bipartisan addiction to borrowing and a refusal to reckon with arithmetic. “This is not capitalism,” Stockman might write, “it’s a simulacrum of capitalism—an endless auction of political favors financed by the Fed’s printing press.”
Stockman would remind readers that when he served as Reagan’s budget director, the expectation was that tax cuts would be offset by deep spending restraint. Instead, deficits ballooned and discipline eroded. The new bill, with its eye-watering cost and lack of credible offsets, is an even more flamboyant departure from any pretense of balance. Stockman would likely deride the Republican celebration as a form of magical thinking, no more credible than the illusions peddled by Democrats. In his telling, the bill is both symptom and accelerant of a broader collapse of fiscal sanity.
All three perspectives converge on a single point: the bill’s enormous impact on the debt trajectory. According to estimates from the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, the legislation could push the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio past 145% by 2050—an unprecedented level for a peacetime economy. While proponents insist that higher growth will mitigate the burden, the Tax Foundation’s dynamic scoring suggests the additional output will cover only a fraction of the revenue loss.
Friedman would insist that economic growth requires both lower taxes and leaner government. Krugman would counter that social stability and productivity demand sustained public investment. Stockman would argue that the entire paradigm—borrowing trillions to finance giveaways—has become a bipartisan racket. Despite their ideological divergences, all three would agree that the arithmetic is merciless. Eventually, debts must be serviced, entitlements must be funded, and the dollar’s credibility must be defended.
What remains is the question of public memory. In the years ahead, as interest payments rise and fiscal constraints tighten, politicians will doubtless blame one another for the bill’s consequences. The narrative will fracture along familiar lines: Republicans will claim the tax cuts were sabotaged by spending; Democrats will argue the spending was hobbled by tax cuts. Independents will declare that neither side ever intended to balance the books. But the numbers, as Friedman and Krugman and Stockman all understood in their own ways, are immune to spin.
There is an old line, attributed variously to Keynes and to an anonymous Treasury mandarin, that the markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent. Perhaps, in this case, Washington can remain irrational longer than the public can remain attentive. But eventually, the bill will come due—not only the legislation signed on Independence Day, but the larger bill for decades of self-deception.
A big, beautiful bill indeed. And perhaps, in the fullness of time, an even bigger, less beautiful reckoning.
| Metric | Estimate |
|---|---|
| Deficit Increase (2025–34) | $3.3–4.1 T (CBO: ≈ $3.4T; CRFB Senate: ≈ $4.1T) |
| Debt-to-GDP Trajectory | Rising, potentially 145–200% by 2050 |
| GDP Growth Impact | +0.6% by 2027, fading to –0.1% by 2034 |
| Revenue Loss | ~$4–5 T over a decade (dynamic) |
| Insured Loss & Social Costs | ~11 M fewer insured; Medicaid/SNAP and health impacts significant |
Trump’s “One Big Beautiful Bill” delivers sweeping tax cuts, spending reductions in social safety nets, and major border/defense expansions—all rolled into one 940-page, $4–5 trillion fiscal package. Bipartisan institutions like the CBO, CRFB, Tax Foundation, and independent watchdogs align on its massive impact:
Here are the three writers whose vantage points are considered:
Why he stands out:
Why he stands out:
Why he stands out: