Tag Archives: Literature

RELIGION, REIMAGINED

In the third-floor study of his home, in wartime Hartford, Wallace Stevens drafted his modernist poem and philosophical meditation  “Notes Toward A Supreme Fiction“, as a secular creed— abstract, changing, and meant to give pleasure—to stand where a worn-out faith once stood.

Beginephebe, by perceiving the idea
Of this invention, this invented world,
The inconceivable idea of the sun.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, September 6, 2025

He never learned to drive. For decades, Wallace Stevens walked the two miles from his home on Westerly Terrace to the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company on Asylum Avenue. The walk itself became a kind of poem: a solitary procession through the stoic, brick-lined streets of a New England city, the rhythm of meter embedding itself in the movement of his body. The crunch of gravel underfoot, the feel of cold air on his face—these were the metronome that set the cadence for his thoughts. He would arrive at the office with lines already formed, phrases taking shape in the quiet hum of his stride.

But what kind of poetry emerges from a man who spends his days pricing catastrophe? During office hours, Stevens turned to policies and claims, reducing calamity to columns of numbers. He knew the language of indemnity, the actuarial calm that measured and priced chaos. Yet outside, the world was burning in ways no policy could contain. The radio spoke of Warsaw reduced to rubble, of Coventry turned to ash. What was a deductible against Dresden? What was a premium against Auschwitz? The ledger comforted, but it lied.

And when the day ended, where did he go to reconcile the irreconcilable? At night, Stevens climbed the narrow staircase to the top floor of his house, entering a space that felt half withdrawn from Hartford itself, as though it belonged more to sky than to street. Down below, trolley bells rang, dogs barked, radios crackled with war bulletins. Up here, only the radiator ticked. The air smelled of paper, tobacco, and ink. On his desk lay a folder carried home that afternoon: typed pages, the ribbon-black letters crisp and uniform. His secretary had produced them that morning, slotting them into a manila folder marked Notes. They sat now in the lamplight, more mysterious than any insurance claim, more charged than any policy.

What could a poem do in 1942? Certainly not repair the world. Yet Stevens felt imagination had to answer catastrophe with something larger than despair. Eliot had turned to Anglican certainty in Four Quartets, weaving fragments into a tapestry of faith. Admirable, yes. But Stevens could not follow him. He could not put belief in a myth while knowing it to be a myth. What remained? Only candor. Only imagination itself.

He opened the folder. The Preface came first, a modest eight lines. He whispered them into the quiet, testing their balance. They were not a commandment but a confession. The “you” of those lines was no person but the project itself: the supreme fiction, imagination’s own power to refresh. “And for what, except for you, do I feel love?” The words startled him even now, black against white, plain as a typed invoice yet trembling with a kind of vulnerable devotion. They challenged every idol: money, power, even the “extremest book of the wisest man,” perhaps Plato, perhaps the Bible, dryly possessed and hidden away in the self. No, he thought, a truly lived truth could not be static. It was a “living changingness,” an “uncertain light” that could nonetheless offer “vivid transparence,” a kind of peace. Here, typed cleanly in a bureaucratic font, was his prayer for a godless age.

But how does one begin such a prayer? He turned the page and entered the first law. Begin, ephebe, by perceiving the idea. The command still startled him. The ephebe: always a novice, always beginning again. Yes, to begin meant stripping away what was inherited—cathedrals thick with guilt, Phoebus in his chariot, Protestant hymns murmured in childhood pews. They no longer held. The old scaffolds collapsed into dust. The voice told him: see the sun again with ignorant eyes. Not Phoebus, not god, not myth—only the sun, bare and difficult.

And what happens when even the sun loses its name? The section closed with the line that haunted him: Phoebus is dead, ephebe. But Phoebus was / A name for something that never could be named. He felt the candor of it. Nietzsche’s cry without Nietzsche’s frenzy. Not a madman in a square, but a quiet verdict written at a desk. The god dead, but the sun still burning. What died was not the light, but the comfort of a name.

Could metaphor survive the death of myth? Another page: It is the celestial ennui of apartments… The phrase made him smile. Ennui of apartments, the weariness of modern rooms, pressing us back toward origins. Yet the origins themselves could be poisonous. So poisonous are the ravishments of truth, so fatal to / The truth itself, the first idea becomes / The hermit in a poet’s metaphors. Truth seduced, then withdrew. Desire was never sated; it renewed itself endlessly, only to vanish again. Schopenhauer lurked here, his vision of the world gnawed by will. Yet where Schopenhauer had seen only despair, Stevens found material for candor. Truth had to retreat into metaphor, glimpsed and lost. Desire itself was not shame but rhythm, the cycle by which imagination endured.

And if truth could be rhythm, could nonsense be revelation? He read the third section slowly: The poem refreshes life so that we share, / For a moment, the first idea… There it was—the poem’s task. Not to console, not to preach, but to refresh. To make perception vivid again. Even nonsense could do it. At night an Arabian in my room, with his damned hoobla-hoobla-hoobla-how… He laughed aloud in the quiet. Nonsense syllables as a kind of truer candor, doves chanting, seas howling hoo. Life’s nonsense pierced us with strange relation. What if absurdity was not opposed to truth but its heartbeat? What if laughter was the sharpest candor of all?

But what if even our myths were secondhand? The fourth section sobered him: The first idea was not our own. Yes. Adam in Eden, Eve with her mirror of air—they had not created anything. They had only encountered what was already there. There was a muddy centre before we breathed. There was a myth before the myth began. He stared at those lines. How blunt they looked, typed like any memorandum, yet carrying the weight of cosmology. Existence preceded language. Clouds had been clouds long before anyone called them gods. We were mimics, not originators, adding our metaphors onto a world that was always other. The clouds were pedagogues, teachers by their very indifference. The air was not a mirror but a board on which we scribbled meanings. How hard it was to admit: the first idea was not ours, never ours.

And if we are not originators, what kind of hero can we be? He turned to the fifth section: The lion roars at the enraging desert… Heroic animals filled the page. Lion, elephant, bear—creatures asserting themselves against emptiness. But then came the turn, the line that caught him like a mirror: But you, ephebe, look from your attic window… Yes, the attic window was his own. Not desert roars but a man clutching his pillow, writhing with dumb violence, cowed by rooftops. The modern hero was not lion or elephant but the solitary human in his narrow room. Yet perhaps this was truer heroism: to lash lions, to teach bears, to turn raw force into candor. Heroism now belonged to ordinaries, to those who endured the attic’s silence.

And what does the eye see when it learns to unsee? He lingered over the sixth section: Not to be realized because not to be seen… The weather itself became abstraction. Franz Hals brushed in clouds, winds moving in strokes. It must be visible or invisible, / Invisible or visible or both: / A seeing and unseeing in the eye. He felt the paradox, the resonance of Zen: to see was also to unsee, to let go in order to glimpse. Truth flashed, vanished, reappeared. Forsythia yellow, northern blue—beauty glimmered, then was gone. Yes, he thought, Okakura Kakuzō was right: truth glimpsed was truer than truth claimed.

But could architecture hold what abstraction revealed? Truth happened not in argument but in rhythm, in breath, in the gait of a body moving. Perhaps there are moments of awakening… Yes, truth came not as achievement but as gift. A balance stumbled into, two people falling into love, a cock announcing absurd perfection. Philosophy as choreography. Doctrine as breath. The eighth section brought architecture: Can we compose a castle-fortress-home, / Even with the help of Viollet-le-Duc…? He thought of Gothic cathedrals restored to an imagined perfection, never as they had been, always as they might have been. That was his work too—not theology restored, but poetic structure remade. The first idea is an imagined thing. Even MacCullough, reading by the sea, might at last hear the waves say what language had always stammered. Logos was only language. And yet language could awaken, could suddenly ease into saying what it had labored to speak.

But what if language, once awakened, began to preach? In the ninth section he heard a warning: The romantic intoning, the declaimed clairvoyance… Apotheosis was a danger. Romantic grandeur could seduce but not sustain. He is and may be but oh! he is, he is… He smiled at the heat in that line even as he resisted its drift toward sanctity. The figure must remain human, a foundling of the infected past, bright and ordinary, precious for the touch that wakes him and the hum of thoughts evaded in the mind. Better to keep him close to candor than to crown him with vision. Give him no names. Dismiss him from your images. Let him be felt in the heart, not embalmed in the eye.

And what, at last, could stand in place of the gods? The tenth section steadied him: The major abstraction is the idea of man / and major man is its exponent. Not a divine figure, not a hero in bronze, but the ordinary walker at the edge of town, trousers sagging, coat worn thin. He could almost see him in Hartford’s dim streets. Cloudless the morning. It is he. The man / In that old coat, those sagging pantaloons… It was of him, he read again, “to make, to confect / The final elegance, not to console / Nor sanctify, but plainly to propound.” No incense, no altar—only candor. The poem would not save; it would say. And in saying plainly, it would give back a kind of dignity to the commonal, to the difficult visage of the everyday.

The attic grew darker. The lamp made a circle of light over the typed sheets. The radiator hissed steadily. From this high room, Stevens whispered the creed that would govern the work to come: It must be abstract. It must change. It must give pleasure. Three laws, enough for a new religion. Not revelation but ethic. Not theology but candor.

He stacked the pages neatly, slid them back into their folder. Tomorrow his secretary would type more, never guessing she was transcribing scripture for an age without gods. The notebook felt less like a book than a reliquary—a vessel for the sacred ordinary. He had reviewed the first law, It Must Be Abstract. Tomorrow—or another night—he would face the second: It Must Change. The world would move; the poem must move with it.

He closed the folder. The command still echoed, inexhaustible: Begin, ephebe, by perceiving the idea. And so he would. Again.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

LIFE, COMPOSED OF NOWS

Emily Dickinson, Zhuangzi, and the art of leaving the self unfinished

By Michael Cummins, Editor, September 5, 2025

The village is still asleep. The moon, a chipped and patient sickle, hangs low over the trees. You feel the cold in your fingertips as you raise the old metal lantern, its flame a solitary heart beating against the glass. You are not on a street in Amherst, of course, but the quiet—the palpable, pre-dawn quiet—feels the same. And it is here, in this hush, that a question, ancient and unnerving, begins to follow you like your own shadow: where is the self, and what does it mean to find it? Emily Dickinson asked it before you, though she rarely left her Amherst room. She held her lanterns in the form of poems, brief and blazing. She never promised answers, only the strangeness of the search.

You begin in secrecy, because secrecy is her element. “I’m Nobody! Who are you? / Are you – Nobody – too?” she whispers to you, conspiratorial. You feel the relief of it — to be Nobody is to escape the demand of being Somebody, of putting on the uniform that the world presses upon you. She invites you into her society of Nobodies, the ones who slip definitions, who resist enclosure. To be Nobody, she suggests, is not emptiness but freedom.

Her room was small but immense. A narrow writing desk beneath the window, where sheets of paper lay scattered like new snow on the dark wood. Ink darkened the edge of her thumb, a tiny bruise of discipline. Beyond the window stretched the orchard, where in spring the blossoms flared white and the bees hummed. On the table beside her were her companions: Shakespeare’s folio with its ragged spine, Wordsworth’s meditations worn soft from handling, Emerson’s essays marked by penciled lines, Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s verses folded into her own books, George Eliot’s novels left open at scenes of moral entanglement.

These were not simply books; they were neighbors, interlocutors, voices she returned to daily. Amherst might have seemed provincial to others, but to Dickinson it was circumference enough: a stage large enough for Shakespeare’s disguises, for Wordsworth’s clouds, for Emerson’s transcendence, for Barrett Browning’s ardor, for Eliot’s fractured heroines. The room itself became a parliament of selves.

Shakespeare was her “Kinsman of the Shelf.” He showed her — and now shows you — how masks both reveal and conceal. Hamlet’s hesitations, Viola’s disguises, Lear’s undoing of self: these are not dramas on a stage but lessons for your own becoming. Hamlet confessed, “I could be bounded in a nutshell, and count myself a king of infinite space.” Dickinson seizes the line, turning it into proof that the mind is immeasurable, that confinement is no barrier to infinity. Shakespeare reminds you that the self is always a performance, and Dickinson presses the point: why pretend the performance ends when the curtain falls?

You follow her into Wordsworth’s solitude. He wandered lonely as a cloud; she among corridors. His belief was that memory could bind the self into unity, that recollection could weave a continuous thread across time. But she never trusted unity. “Forever is composed of nows,” she tells you. The line falls sharp. Each moment breaks from the last. The self is not stitched across years but scattered, provisional, as fragile as dew on grass. Wordsworth offers you continuity; Dickinson offers you fragments. Which feels truer in your own bones?

She leads you toward Emerson next. He believed the soul was porous, connected with nature, radiant with divinity. She nods. “The soul should always stand ajar,” she confides. Ajar, never shut. You realize that for her, as for Emerson, the self is not an essence to guard but a threshold to keep open. She urges you to feel the draft, to allow uncertainty to pass through you, to leave the latch unfastened. Emerson would call it “self-reliance”; she calls it slant openness, an interior door that refuses to close.

Elizabeth Barrett Browning gives you another lesson. She wrote from the margins but spoke to the center, with an intensity Dickinson admired and absorbed. “How do I love thee? Let me count the ways—” but Dickinson is wary of counting. Love and self both resist enumeration. From Browning she learns that vulnerability need not weaken authority; it can sharpen it. To be obscure, unseen, or marginal is not to be powerless. Sometimes it is the condition of the truest voice.

And then George Eliot. Dickinson asks you to imagine Dorothea or Maggie — characters entangled in duty, yearning, and transformation. Eliot’s realism feels psychological, but it points beyond itself: the self is not whole but splintered. Dickinson makes you see that your own splintering is not failure but form. “I am out with lanterns,” she repeats, and you know she means that the search is endless, the light always partial.

Yet still the question: what if the self cannot be found? Here she startles you with an echo from far away, across centuries and continents: Zhuangzi. She never read him, could not have, but she might have been his twin in thought. He dreamed he was a butterfly and then wondered if he was a man dreaming a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming a man. He laughed at the impossibility of deciding. Dickinson smiles slantwise and tells you: “Not knowing when the dawn will come / I open every door.” The butterfly, the door — both insist on openness, on the refusal to foreclose.

And now, as you stand in her parlor of words, you hear it — a dialogue across time.


Dickinson: I am Nobody. Yet they wish to make me Somebody. What is safer: to vanish, or to accept their gaze?
Zhuangzi: Once there was a great tree, twisted and useless. The carpenters passed it by, for it could not be carved into planks. Because it was useless, it lived. Be useless, and you will be free.

Dickinson: Then to be Nobody is to be spared the axe? But tell me, is not even Nobody still a name, a disguise of another sort?
Zhuangzi: The butterfly does not ask if it is a man. The man does not ask if he is a butterfly. Who names them? Who cares?

Dickinson: And yet I write letters to the World — “That never wrote to Me –.” What am I, if no answer comes? Is identity only formed in reply?
Zhuangzi: A bell stands silent until struck. But its silence is still its music. Do not wait for the world to strike you; your sound is already within.

Dickinson: You tempt me toward silence. Yet my discipline is not silence but poems. Shakespeare speaks in soliloquies, Wordsworth in recollections, Emerson in sermons. I speak in fragments, dashes. Is fragmentation a way of freedom, or only proof that I fail to hold myself together?
Zhuangzi: The fish trap exists to catch the fish. When the fish is caught, forget the trap. Words exist to catch meaning. When the meaning is caught, forget the words. Why should your dashes not be your freedom?

Dickinson: And contradiction? “Do I contradict myself?” Whitman booms across the meadow. “Very well then I contradict myself.” I too contradict, though softly. “Forever is composed of nows.” Each now undoes the last. Is contradiction a crime?
Zhuangzi: The Way is crooked. Straightness is an illusion. Contradiction is the only truth.

Dickinson: Then I need not bind the self with thread. I may let it splinter. Yet I ask again: is there a self at all? Emerson insists it is divine. George Eliot sketches it in moral struggle. Elizabeth Barrett Browning pours it into love. What say you?
Zhuangzi: The self is like the reflection in water. Touch it, and it ripples. Chase it, and it vanishes. Sit quietly, and it returns of its own accord.

Dickinson: Then perhaps my lantern is foolish. To be “out with lanterns, looking for myself” — am I lighting only shadows?
Zhuangzi: Light or shadow, both are passing. The lantern is not to find the self, but to remind you that the dark is endless.

Dickinson: Then let us agree — the self is not to be found but to be left ajar, like the door. Yet how shall the poem live, if it refuses to close?
Zhuangzi: The cicada sings and dies. Its song does not last, yet summer is filled with it. Your fragments are cicadas. Do not grieve their brevity; rejoice their season.


You step back, startled by the ease with which their voices intertwine. Dickinson with her dashes, Zhuangzi with his parables, both circling the same question from opposite corners of the world. She insists that “The soul should always stand ajar”; he insists that the consummate person has no self. She opens every door; he dreams every dream. Both resist the foreclosure of identity.

But Dickinson feels the ache of her unanswered letters. You sense it in the quiver of her lines: the longing for reply, for recognition. “This is my letter to the World / That never wrote to Me –.” For Zhuangzi, the silence is natural, even welcome — the useless tree lives precisely because it receives no attention. For her, the silence is double-edged: both protection and wound. And yet perhaps her unanswered letter is itself a butterfly dream — written, released, never knowing if it lands. What she sought was not a reply but the freedom of sending. To write without guarantee is to live ajar.

You picture Dickinson again in her Amherst room. The parlor is quiet, but her books lie open like other selves she tried on: Shakespeare, with his disguises; Wordsworth, with his recollections; Emerson, with his transcendental openness; Browning, with her fierce intimacy; Eliot, with her moral fractures. They were her chorus, the voices she carried in her narrow chamber. She argued with them, borrowed from them, contradicted them, as she now contradicts Zhuangzi. Her soul was never empty, only ajar.

She asks you now to imagine the butterfly hovering at her window, wings trembling in a New England dusk. She does not know whether she is woman or butterfly, Nobody or Somebody, poet or recluse. But she does know this: “Tell all the truth but tell it slant.” And truth — like the self — can only be glimpsed in slant light, never seized in full.

The lantern in your hand trembles, and she smiles. “Not knowing when the dawn will come,” she repeats, “I open every door.” You realize now that the dawn is not the goal; the opening is. The self is not the prize; the refusal to close is. She never read Zhuangzi, but she lived as if his butterfly had hovered at her window.

And so the essay of her life remains unfinished, because it cannot be concluded. Like the butterfly, she slips out of the net, leaving you only with the shimmer of wings. Her identity is not a truth to be nailed down but a truth to be lived ajar. Forever, she reminds you, is composed of nows.

And what of you? To walk with her is to feel the temptation to fix yourself: to declare, to brand, to belong. But Dickinson leans close and whispers otherwise. Do not be Somebody. Do not close the soul. Do not chase coherence. To be Nobody is not despair but possibility. To keep the lantern lit is not to find but to seek. Your task is not to seize identity but to hold the door ajar, to live in fragments, to write letters without reply, to be both butterfly and man, woman and dream, Nobody and all.

You stand at her threshold, lantern in hand, and you hear her question ripple across time, through Zhuangzi’s laughter and her own slant whispers: Who are you? Nobody? Somebody? Both? Neither? Perhaps the self is not meant to be found at all. Perhaps it is meant only to flicker, like a butterfly’s wings in dream, or like a soul forever leaning toward the open door.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

THE GHOST IN THE SYNTAX

Why Shakespeare’s lines demand intention, not imitation—and why machines can only echo sound.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, September 3, 2025

The rehearsal room was cold enough that the young actor’s breath lingered in the air. He stood on the stage with a copy of Macbeth, its pages soft from use, and whispered the line under his breath before daring it aloud: Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow. The words fell flat the first time. Too rehearsed. Too conscious. He shook his head, tried again, letting the syllables drag as if they themselves were weary from carrying time. Creeps in this petty pace from day to day… The repetition was not just fatalism; it was the sound of a man unraveling, his will eroded by grief and futility. The rhythm itself had to ache.

A machine could, of course, manage the cadence. A program could be tuned to repeat the word “tomorrow” with perfect solemnity, to stretch the vowels just so. Google’s WaveNet system can produce uncanny variations of stress, hesitation, even sighs—digital sighs—at precisely calculated intervals. DeepMind’s recent work on “expressive TTS” allows a line to be rendered in tones of grief, anger, joy, or boredom. There are demo reels online where Shakespeare is fed through these systems, and the result is surprisingly competent. But competency is not intention. What the young actor does—searching for futility in his own chest, summoning weariness from his own private reservoir—cannot be coded. Intent is not in the sound of the line; it’s in the act of dying a little as you speak it.

This is what Shakespeare demands, again and again: not just language, but will. His characters live on the knife-edge of consequence, their words pressed out by motive. Romeo, stumbling over Tybalt’s body, gasps, O, I am fortune’s fool! He has just killed his wife’s cousin, wrecked his future, and tasted blood he never meant to spill. It isn’t just regret—it’s horror, the shock of realizing you’ve become the villain in your own love story. No algorithm can know the sting of unintended consequence. An AI might shout the words, might even deliver them with trembling emphasis, but the cry comes from a boy watching his own destiny collapse. The line does not live without that recognition.

The experiment has been tried. In 2022, an AI-generated voice performed Romeo’s balcony scene at a conference in Vienna. Listeners were impressed—some even moved. But when the line O, I am fortune’s fool! rang out, the room chuckled. It wasn’t just that the intonation was slightly off; it was that the cry lacked stakes. It was Romeo without a pulse, Romeo without a body to bear the guilt. The line did not fall short technically—it fell short existentially.

Hamlet’s soliloquies are the most treacherous test. In Act II he marvels and recoils at the same time: What a piece of work is man… How noble in reason, how infinite in faculty. It sounds like admiration, but it isn’t pure. The words turn over themselves—what ought to inspire awe instead curdles into disgust. He sees hypocrisy in every supposed nobility, futility in every faculty. An actor must carry the irony in his voice, lacing admiration with loathing, as though the words taste bitter even as they sound grand. An AI might deliver a clean, almost clinical balance—“admiration” followed by “disgust”—like toggling sliders on a mixing board. But irony is not a switch. It’s a wound dressed in velvet.

When DeepMind released an expressive model that could generate “sarcasm,” the tech press hailed it as proof that machines could finally do subtlety. Yet what we heard was not a fractured human voice, but a pristine and empty performance. The algorithm delivered a raised-eyebrow cadence, the verbal equivalent of a painted-on smile—a gesture without the impulse to conceal. This is the core of the paradox: sarcasm and irony are built on a bedrock of paradox—they require a speaker to mean two things at once, to hold a contradictory feeling in their voice and body. A computer cannot hold a contradiction. It can only cycle between two different outputs. It cannot fracture its own will; it can only mask its lack of will with a calculated pose. It’s a perfect pantomime of motive, but it is not the thing itself.

John Barton, co-founder of the Royal Shakespeare Company, once said that “Shakespeare is inexhaustible because he leaves space for the actor’s choice. Every pause, every stress opens a door.” The line is telling: it is choice that keeps the plays alive, not just rhythm. Machines can render a pause, but they cannot choose it. They have no sense of opening a door.

Brook went further. In The Empty Space, he wrote: “A word, a movement, a gesture is empty until it is filled with the life of the actor who chooses it in the moment. That life cannot be faked.” Brook believed theatre was only alive because of its fragility—the possibility of collapse at any instant. An AI-generated Lear might roar flawlessly through every line, but the roar would lack the pulse of possible failure. For Brook, this pulse was theatre itself.

The question of intention extends far beyond Shakespeare. What of a writer like Samuel Beckett, whose characters mutter their way through a landscape of despair? Molloy, in his absurdist journey, seems driven by nothing but habit. Yet even his rambling, fragmented speech is an act of will. He confesses, he tries to make sense, he fails. The very act of muttering is a defiant choice against silence and nonexistence. The words tumble out of him not because of a calculation of probability, but because he is compelled by the fundamental, human need to bear witness to his own suffering. He wants to be heard, even if he doesn’t know why. The machine, by contrast, cannot be propelled by such need; it does not hunger or fear silence.

Borges provides another mirror. In “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” he imagines a modern writer who painstakingly rewrites Don Quixote word for word—identical to Cervantes, yet different in meaning because of intention. The same words in a different century become charged with irony. Borges understood that words are never just words; they are vessels for will, for history, for desire. An AI could reproduce Shakespeare endlessly, but reproduction is not creation. The ghost of intent makes the difference.

Shakespeare writes as if to test whether a human voice can hold the charge of intention. Lear’s roar against the storm is the most elemental: Blow, winds, and crack your cheeks! It is not just noise; it is betrayal breaking loose. A father disowned, a king humiliated, Lear rages not only at the storm but at the cosmos for his madness and grief. It is a voice already fractured, demanding nature itself collapse. A machine can roar, yes. It can pump bass through speakers, crack like thunder. But it cannot bleed. To speak Lear’s line without the tremor of betrayal is to strip it bare of meaning.

The theater knows this well. In 2019, the Royal Shakespeare Company tested an AI-generated “co-performer” in an experimental production. The system generated lines in response to actors’ improvisations, its voice projected from a disembodied orb above the stage. The critics were fascinated, but they noted the same flaw: the AI could surprise, but it could not intend. The actors on stage carried the burden of consequence; the machine was a clever ghost.

Harold Bloom once wrote that Shakespeare “invented the human as we know it.” What he meant was not that Shakespeare created humanity, but that he revealed in language the contradictions, desires, and paradoxes that shape us. Bloom’s point makes the AI test more daunting: if Shakespeare gave us the map of interiority, then any performance that lacks interiority—any performance without stakes—is not merely deficient, but disqualified.

And then there is Portia, standing in the court of The Merchant of Venice, her voice softening into moral persuasion: The quality of mercy is not strained… It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven. Here intent is everything. Portia is not just lawyering; she is pleading with the very idea of justice, urging her audience to see mercy as divine, inexhaustible. Her belief must be palpable. A machine could roll the syllables like pearls, but eloquence without conviction is nothing but polish. What gives the line its power is the speaker’s faith that mercy belongs to the order of heaven. Without that belief, it’s rhetoric without heart.

Here the cultural anecdote is darker: in 2021, an AI-generated voice was used in a court training exercise to deliver witness testimony. The experiment was intended to test jurors’ susceptibility to persuasion by machine voices. The results were mixed: some jurors reported being swayed, others reported discomfort. What unsettled them was not the quality of the performance but the absence of belief behind it. To be persuaded by words without will felt like manipulation, not argument. One legal scholar described the prospect as “trial by ventriloquism”—justice bent not by human persuasion, but by hollow eloquence.

The ghost in the syntax grows clearest here. Machines can offer us form—eloquence, cadence, even dramatic surprise. What they cannot provide is risk. An actor saying The quality of mercy risks hypocrisy if he fails to embody belief. The line costs him something. A machine, by contrast, cannot fail. Every performance is safe, repeatable, consequence-free. And it is precisely consequence that makes Shakespeare’s words ache.

The paradox is that we, as listeners, are complicit. We project intention onto anything that speaks. We hear a chatbot offer sympathy, and we feel soothed. We hear an AI-generated sonnet, and we marvel at its poignancy. We want to find meaning. We bring the ghost with us. The ELIZA effect—named for one of the earliest chatbots—was discovered in the 1960s: people poured out their souls to a crude program that only echoed their words back. If we can believe that, we can certainly believe in an AI Lear. But the belief is ours, not the machine’s.

Could AI ever cross the threshold? Some technologists argue that with enough layers, enough feedback loops, emergent properties might arise that resemble motive. Perhaps one day a synthetic voice will “choose” to pause differently, to inflect a line with bitterness not because a human trained it so, but because its internal processes made that choice inevitable. If so, would that be intent—or the perfect illusion of intent? The philosophers divide: John Searle insists that no simulation, however perfect, ever achieves the thing itself; Daniel Dennett argues that if behavior is indistinguishable from intent, the distinction may not matter. The stage, however, resists the reduction. A pause can be “indistinguishable” only if we do not ask what it costs the speaker to pause.

The Royal Shakespeare Company, now experimenting with immersive technologies, has been clear-eyed about the limits. Sarah Ellis, their director of digital development, called the company’s work with Intel’s motion capture in The Tempest “21st-century puppetry.” She explained: “The actor is always driving the performance. The technology amplifies, but it cannot replace.” The line could have been written as a manifesto for the AI age: amplification without intention is echo, not expression.

Back in the rehearsal room, the young actor stumbles. His voice cracks slightly on a word, a small imperfection that carries more meaning than a perfect rendition ever could. The director, sitting at the edge of the stage, leans forward, attentive. The line is not flawless, but it is alive. The risk of failure is what makes the moment vibrate.

A machine could reproduce the monologue flawlessly. It could echo a thousand performances until the averages smoothed every edge. But what it could never offer is that tremor. The possibility of failure. The risk that gives intention its bite. For intention is always wager, always consequence, always stake. Without it, words are only words, no matter how well they trip on the tongue.

And that is Shakespeare’s test. Could AI ever deliver his lines with intent? Not unless it learns to bleed, to risk, to believe. Until then, it will remain what it is: syntax without a ghost. We may listen, we may marvel, we may even project a soul into the sound. But when the storm clears, when Romeo cries out, when Portia pleads, it will not be the machine we hear. It will be ourselves, searching for meaning where none was meant.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS – SEPTEMBER 11, 2025 PREVIEW

LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS: The latest issue features ‘Why we need Dorothy Parker’; Biography of a Biography; David Lynch’s Gee-Wizardry


Ellmann’s Joyce: The Biography of a Masterpiece and Its Maker 
by Zachary Leader

Constant Reader: The New Yorker Columns 1927-28 by Dorothy Parker

Dorothy Parker: Poems by Dorothy Parker

Dorothy Parker in Hollywood by Gail Crowther

David Lynch’s American Dreamscape: Music, Literature, Cinema by Mike Miley

THE CAFÉ OF ECHOES

At Caffè Florian, a poet rehearses silence, quarrels with Ruskin, and dines with memory.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, September 2, 2025

In the autumn of 1883, Robert Browning arrived in Venice not as a poet seeking inspiration, but as a man rehearsing his own silence. He was seventy-one, celebrated in England yet still dogged by the charge of obscurity, more famous abroad for Elizabeth’s immortal sonnets than for his own labyrinths. This essay is not fact but speculation, not history but atmosphere: Browning imagined at his table in Caffè Florian, where mirrors, velvet, and silence conspired with memory to become his final stage.

The boat nudged the dock like a hesitant thought. Browning stepped off with the stiffness of age and the grace of habit. The air smelled of brine and stone, of centuries folded into mist. He paused, cane in hand, and looked toward the dome of the Salute—its silhouette a question mark against the morning haze. Seventy-one years weighted his shoulders, but he stood upright, as though irony itself were a brace. The vaporetto pulled away, its wake dissolving into green silk. He had no luggage beyond a notebook and the ghosts already crowding his mind.

The fog is not weather—it is thought. It thickens, withdraws, curls back upon itself. Even in this cup before me it lingers: caffè corretto, black cut with brandy, bitter and sweet as a line half-finished. Florian is dim at this hour, its velvet walls inhaling the echoes of centuries. Mirrors multiply the room into infinity. Each reflection a fragment of me: old, young, diminished, fractured. A poet made a kaleidoscope.

Byron once sat here, Goethe scribbled here, conspirators whispered “Viva San Marco!” in the Sala del Senato. Today I sit, ordering polenta e schie—shrimp fried in brine—and the taste is lagoon, memory, salt. A plate of amaretti arrives, sugared consolation. The waiter suggests biscotti di mandorla as well, almonds crushed into sweetness. I chew slowly. The polenta is soft, golden, humble—like memory softened by time. The schie, tiny survivors of the lagoon, taste of endurance. Amaretti crumble like old letters, sugared on the outside, hollow at the core. The coffee, thick as ink, stains the tongue with bitterness and clarity. Florian does not serve meals; it serves metaphors.

Across the square, Quadri blazes with chandeliers, an operatic stage flattering the surface. Florian is darker, more inward. Its light is borrowed, its silences long. Quadri is performance for an audience. Florian is monologue.

I open my notebook: Ruskin, copied lines from The Stones of Venice. His voice has been my reluctant companion for thirty years. “We may live without her, and worship without her, but we cannot remember without her.” John, always the preacher. He carved morality into marble, turned buttresses into sermons. For him, Venice’s decline was sin. For me, decline is theatre. To remember is not to repent but to perform again. Memory is rehearsal.

The waiter refills my cup. The brandy sharpens thought, steadies irony. I recall my own lines from A Toccata of Galuppi’s:

As for Venice and her people, merely born to bloom and drop,
Here on earth they bore their fruitage, mirth and folly were the crop.

I scolded them then. How Puritan I was. Sitting now at Florian, I envy them. Folly is not failure; it is fruit. Who begrudges the bloom because it falls?

A German couple at the next table mutter Goethe. Their syllables stumble in Venetian air. A waiter tells a French traveler that Byron loved their zabaglione. A young woman sketches the gilded lamp above the doorway, her graphite smudged. She glances at me: “Are you a writer?” “No,” I reply, “a reader of ruins.” She frowns, puzzled. Youth believes silence means emptiness.

Elizabeth drifts through the mirrors. Her eyes catch mine across the velvet gloom. She wrote of Florence in Casa Guidi Windows, calling for liberty. She saw windows; I see walls. She opened; I enclosed. She is remembered for love, I for irony.

Her voice returns in my By the Fire-Side:

Oh, moment one and infinite!
The water slips o’er stock and stone;
The West is tender, yet the night
So soon must veil it, mine alone.

The water slips even now beneath the piazza stones. Tenderness yields to night. And yet—even absence is mine.

I once watched her read Petrarch aloud at Casa Guidi, her voice trembling with belief. She said poetry must lift. I said it must dig. We never resolved it. But in Venice, I hear her voice lifting still, even as I dig. I imagine writing a letter to her, one I will never send: My dearest Ba, Florian multiplies us in its mirrors. You see eternity; I see fragments. You spoke love; I speak echoes. And still, together, we wrote scaffolding for survival.

Ruskin appears across the table, severe, ascetic, with eyes that drill into conscience. He clears his throat: “The first cause of the fall of Venice was her falsehood.” He gestures to Florian’s mirrors. “Deceit multiplied.”

I answer: “John, is not poetry falsehood? Have I not spoken through murderers and monks, adulterers and judges? Masks, every one. But tell me—was the mask less true than the face?”

He insists: “Gothic is the expression of a Christian people, the confession of their faith in the work of their hands.”

I sip. “Faith, carved into cornices, labor engraved in stone. And what has it left us? Ruins. Whereas the Renaissance, with all its duplicity, left us colour, flourish, theatre. I prefer a glowing lie to a tedious truth.”

Ruskin frowns: “The Lamp of Truth must burn in every arch.”

“Truth burns, yes,” I reply, “but it also blinds. Give me the lamp of illusion, John. It casts longer shadows.”

I remember reading Ruskin aloud to Elizabeth once, in Florence, when his Seven Lamps of Architecture was still fresh. She had shaken her head. “He sees sermons in stone,” she said. “I see spirit in breath.” We argued half the night, she quoting Casa Guidi Windows, I muttering that breath is nothing without scaffolding. And here I sit now, scaffolding without breath.

The waiter brings another plate, sets down biscotti di mandorla. Ruskin fades into the mirror. I smile. I have won the debate by eating.

But another ghost sidles into Florian: Byron, lounging with rakish ease, boots muddy from some clandestine canal adventure. He leans back, laughing: “Browning, you scold folly, yet you envy it. Admit it—you envy me.” I do. I envied him once, his thunder, his immediate grip on the world. Venice loved his scandal, his Don Juan verses written between embraces. I admired the music, the power, the theatricality, even as I recoiled from his flamboyance. He used Venice as a symbol of faded grandeur, of moral ambiguity. And have I not done the same, though with less applause? “You were lightning,” I tell him. “I am only the echo.” He winks. “Echoes last longer than thunder.”

And Shelley, gentler, spectral, drifts in too. He never lodged here long—only passed through—but his lyricism breathed Italy. I remember writing Pauline, my first confession of a poet’s soul, under his influence. Shelley gave me metaphysics tuned to music, ideals sung into air. I once wrote a short poem, Memorabilia, about shaking hands with a man who had known him. Imagine—that thrill of proximity! Shelley’s ghost leans toward me now, whispering: “Poetry must lift, Robert, even from ruins.” His words tremble like a lyre string.

I admire Shelley still, though I turned away from his idealism. He lifted; I dug. He soared; I performed. And yet, I cannot deny: his fusion of thought and song shaped me as much as Byron’s theatre. Byron gave me thunder, Shelley gave me music. Elizabeth gave me breath. Ruskin gave me quarrel. And Venice—Venice gives me echo.

I recall In a Gondola, my youthful play with passion:

The soul of music slumbers in the shell
Till waked and kindled by the master’s spell.

How earnest I was. I believed love eternal, dramatised into permanence. Now I know better. Love is architectural. It leaves ruins. One walks among them—not grateful for permanence, but for echo.

The young artist glances at me again, and this time she sketches my hand—gnarled, ink-stained, resting on the cup. I wonder what she sees. Not the poet, surely. Perhaps only a ruin worth recording. Perhaps only another relic of Venice.

Florian’s velvet breathes of centuries. The Sala del Senato still hums with 1848, Daniele Manin declaring the Republic of San Marco. I imagine their whispers lingering, “Viva San Marco!” clinging to the mirrors. Byron’s laughter, Shelley’s sighs, Casanova’s schemes, Goldoni’s wit—all still staged. The velvet absorbs nothing; it amplifies.

Outside, the piazza fills with orchestras. From Florian, a waltz in minor key, introspective, precise, like Strauss slowed by melancholy. From Quadri across the stones, a polka, bright, frivolous, Offenbach reborn in defiance. The melodies clash above San Marco. Venice plays both scores at once, refusing to choose between tragedy and farce.

I attempt a stanza in my head to match their duel, half-jesting, half-serious:

One side mourns with violins, one side laughs with brass,
Yet both belong to Venice, as shadow and mirror pass.
I sit between the melodies, cane planted, glass in hand,
Hearing waltz and polka argue what I cannot command.

The waiter sets down another caffè corretto. I trace the rim of the cup, whisper fragments that may form another book. A line half aloud:

One who never turned his back but marched breast forward,
Never doubted clouds would break…

I know better. Clouds often do not break. Yet I say it still. Faith is not in triumph, but in endurance.

Elizabeth’s ghost leans across the table, chiding gently. She opened windows, I enclosed walls. She gave hope; I gave puzzles. She left sonnets; I left monologues. She is love’s voice; I am irony’s echo. Together we were scaffold and soul. Alone, I am scaffold only.

The German couple departs, their voices swallowed by velvet. The gondolier outside cries a Byron line again, misremembered. The young woman finishes her sketch, closes her notebook. I scribble a note in Ruskin’s margin: “Dear Mr. Ruskin, Gothic is faith hewn in stone. Renaissance is theatre. And theatre endures longer than sermons.”

I close the notebook, order one last plate—polenta e schie again, salt and brine against the tongue. Outside, gondolas drift like commas in an endless sentence. Mirrors scatter me into fragments. Florian holds me like a stage.

Ruskin’s voice returns from memory: “When we build, let us think that we build for ever.” Poor John. Nothing lasts forever. Not fresco, not marble, not even love. But echoes last. And echo is all art requires.

Tomorrow I depart. The fog will remain. And somewhere in it, a voice—hers, mine, ours—will echo still.

They will read me in fragments, quote me in footnotes, misunderstand me in classrooms. That is the fate of poets. But if one reader hears the echo—hears Elizabeth’s breath in my silence, hears Venice in my irony, hears Byron’s thunder subdued into cadence, hears Shelley’s song distilled into thought—then I have not vanished. I have rehearsed eternity.

And when I return, as I surely shall, though not by will but by death’s courtesy, they will bring my coffin to the Salute. Bells will toll, gondolas will line the water, poets will compose their elegies. They will call me Venice’s last guest, though I was only ever her reader of ruins. Elizabeth will not be there, but I will hear her still, in the fog, in the echo, in the silence.

For art does not conclude. It endures. Like Venice herself, it is scaffolding and soul, ruin and flame, silence and applause. And in the hush that follows, I hear my own final stanza rehearsed already by this city—Ruskin’s stones, Elizabeth’s voice, Byron’s thunder, Shelley’s song, Galuppi’s chords, my reluctant cadence—echoing forever across the water.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

LITERARY REVIEW – SEPTEMBER 2025

LITERARY REVIEW : The latest issue features ‘Mysteries of Marlowe’

Dark Renaissance: The Dangerous Times and Fatal Genius of Shakespeare’s Greatest Rival, Christopher Marlowe By Stephen Greenblatt
The Boundless Deep: Young Tennyson, Science, and the Crisis of Belief By Richard Holmes
A Scandal in Königsberg, 1835–1842 By Christopher Clark

THE MAN WHO INVENTED THE MODERN THRILLER

Before Hitchcock or Highsmith, there was Pietro Aretino—Renaissance Venice’s scandalous satirist who turned gossip into cliffhangers and obscenity into art. The man who terrified popes may also have invented the modern thriller.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 29, 2025

Venice, 1537

The candle gutters in its brass dish, casting a crooked halo on the damp walls of a salon off the Grand Canal. Pietro Aretino leans back in his chair, one boot propped on a velvet footstool, his voice curling through the smoke like a blade. He does not write—he dictates. A scribe, young and ink-stained, hunches over parchment, trying to keep pace. The letter—addressed, perhaps, to a cardinal, perhaps to a painter—will contain more than pleasantries. It will contain a threat, veiled as an observation, wrapped in a joke.

“Princes fear me more than the plague,” Aretino murmurs, eyes half-lidded. “For I do not kill bodies—I murder reputations.”

The scribe pauses, startled. Aretino waves him on. “Write it. Let them tremble.”

Tomorrow, this page will cross the lagoon, board a courier’s horse, and ignite tremors in Rome or Paris. It may be copied, whispered, condemned. It may be burned. But it will be read.

It was Aretino’s genius to recognize that scandal was not merely gossip—it was architecture. A scaffolding of insinuation and revelation designed to leave its victim dangling. In his six volumes of Lettere (1537–1557), he sharpened that architecture to a fine point. Written to popes, kings, artists, and courtesans, the letters are part autobiography, part political commentary, and wholly performance. “I speak to the powerful as I would to a neighbor,” he crowed, “for truth makes no bow.” What terrified his recipients was not what he said but what he withheld. His words worked like cliffhangers: each letter a suspense novel in miniature.

Aretino liked to imagine himself not born in Arezzo, as the records claimed, but in his own tongue. The myth suited him: a man conjured out of ink and scandal rather than flesh and baptismal water. By the 1520s, he was notorious as the flagello dei principi—the scourge of princes. The title was not a label pinned on him by enemies; it was one he cultivated, polished, and wore like armor. “I carry more lives in my inkpot than the hangman in his noose,” he declared, and few doubted it.

His life was a play in which he cast himself as both author and protagonist. When Pope Clement VII hesitated to pay him, Aretino wrote slyly, “Your Holiness, whose charity is beyond compare, surely requires no reminder of the poverty that afflicts your devoted servant.” In another letter, he praised the Pope’s mercy while threatening to reveal “those excesses which Rome whispers but dares not record.” He lived by double edge: each compliment a prelude, each benediction a warning.

The tactic was not confined to popes. To Michelangelo he sent fulsome admiration: “Your brush moves like lightning, striking down the pride of the ancients.” To Titian he became impresario, writing to Francis I of France that no royal gallery could be complete without Titian’s brush. But the same pen could turn against friend or patron in an instant. A single phrase from Aretino could undo a reputation; a withheld rumor could ruin a night’s sleep.

His enemies often answered with violence. In Rome, in 1525, mercenaries burst into his lodgings after he lampooned the papal indulgence sellers in his Frottole. They dragged him into the street and beat him nearly to death. Neighbors recalled him crawling, bloodied, back to his rooms. Later, when asked why he returned to writing almost immediately, he grinned through broken teeth: “Even death cannot silence a tongue as sharp as mine.” The scars became his punctuation. “My scars,” he wrote in the Lettere, “are the punctuation marks of my story.”

Aretino’s letters functioned like serialized thrillers. Each installment built tension, each cliffhanger left its audience half-terrified, half-delighted. He understood that suggestion could be more devastating than revelation, that anticipation was more dangerous than disclosure. He used ambiguity as a weapon, seeding his pages with conditional phrases: “It is said,” “One hears,” “Were I less discreet…” They were not evasions. They were traps.

One courtier compared the experience to “sitting at supper and finding the meat still bleeding.” The reader was implicated, made complicit in the scandal’s unfolding. Aretino’s genius lay in turning the audience into co-conspirators.

And Venice—city of masks, labyrinths, and whispered betrayals—was practically designed as the birthplace of the thriller. Long before the genre had a name, its ingredients were already steeping in the canals: duplicity, desire, surveillance, and the ever-present threat of exposure. Aretino didn’t write thrillers in form, but he mastered their emotional architecture. His letters were suspenseful, his dialogues scandalous, his persona a walking cliffhanger. Venice gave him the perfect mise-en-scène: a place where truth wore a disguise and reputation was currency. The city itself functioned like a thriller plot—beautiful on the surface, treacherous underneath.

And consider the mechanics: the masked ball becomes the thriller’s false identity. The gondola ride at midnight becomes the covert rendezvous. The whispered rumor in a candlelit salon becomes the inciting incident. The Contarini garden becomes the secret meeting place where alliances shift and truths unravel. It is no accident that Henry James, Daphne du Maurier, Patricia Highsmith, and Donna Leon all returned to Venice when they wanted to explore psychological tension and moral ambiguity. The city doesn’t just host thrillers—it is one.

Imagine a summer evening in 1537. The garden is fragrant with jasmine and fig. Aretino reclines beneath a pergola, flanked by Titian and a Greek scholar from Crete. A courtesan named Nanna pours wine into silver cups.

“You paint gods,” Aretino says to Titian, “but I paint men. And men are far more dangerous.”

Titian chuckles. “Gods do not pay commissions.”

The scholar leans in. “And men do not forgive.”

Nanna smirks, leaning on the marble balustrade. “And yet men pay both of you—in gold for their portraits, in secrets for his letters.”

Aretino raises his cup. “Which is why I never ask forgiveness. Only attention.”

Venice itself became a character: beautiful, deceptive, morally ambiguous. Its canals mirrored the duplicity of its citizens. Its masks—literal and figurative—echoed Aretino’s own performative identity.

But letters were only one weapon. In 1527, Aretino detonated another: the Sonetti lussuriosi, written to accompany Giulio Romano’s engravings known as I Modi. The sonnets made no attempt at discretion. In one, a woman gasps mid-embrace, “Oh God, if this be sin, then let me sin forever!” In another, a lover interrupts her partner’s poetic boasting with the sharp command: “Speak less and thrust more.” The verses shocked even worldly Rome. Pope Clement VII banned the work, copies were burned, and Aretino’s name became synonymous with obscenity. Yet suppression only heightened its allure. “My verses are daggers,” he later said, “that caress before they strike.”

He followed with the Ragionamenti (1534–1536), dialogues between prostitutes and matrons that turned confession into carnival. In the Dialogo della Nanna e della Antonia, one woman scoffs, “The cardinals pray with their lips while their hands wander beneath the skirts.” In the Dialogo nel quale la Nanna insegna a la Pippa, the older courtesan instructs a young girl in survival: “A woman must learn to wield her body as men wield their swords.” These were not just bawdy jokes but philosophical inversions. They exposed hypocrisy with laughter and turned vice into discourse.

His comedies struck with equal force. In La Cortigiana (1534), a satire of Roman society, a friar assures his audience: “Do as I say, not as I do—for my sins are a privilege of office.” In Il Marescalco, a groom forced into marriage laments, “Better to wed a sword than a wife, for steel at least does not betray.” In La Talanta, he boasted with characteristic swagger: “My tongue is the scourge of princes and the trumpet of truth.” These plays were not staged fantasies but mirrors held to the world. Rome and Venice recognized themselves, and recoiled.

Even his occasional pieces carried teeth. During the sack of Rome, he penned the Frottole (1527), short verses filled with bitter humor: “The Germans loot the altars, the Spaniards strip the nuns, and Christ hides his face behind the clouds.” Earlier still, in Il Testamento dell’Elefante Hanno (1516), he composed a mock will for Pope Leo X’s pet elephant. The beast bequeathed its tusks to the cardinals and its dung to the faithful: “For the people, my eternal gift, what Rome already feeds them daily.” Juvenile, grotesque, and brilliant, it set the tone for a lifetime of satiric violence.

Was Aretino a moralist or a manipulator? The question haunts his legacy. Like Machiavelli, he understood power. Like Montaigne, he understood performance. His satire was not disinterested—it was strategic. He exposed corruption, yes, but he also profited from it. His critics accused him of blackmail, of cruelty, of vulgarity. But Aretino saw himself as a mirror. “I do not invent,” he wrote, “I reflect.” The discomfort lay not in his words, but in their accuracy.

The dilemma still feels modern. When does exposure serve truth, and when does it become spectacle? Is scandal a form of justice—or just another form of entertainment? To read Aretino is to feel that question sharpen into relevance. He knew the intoxicating pleasure of watching a hypocrite stripped bare, but he also knew the profit of keeping the knife just shy of the skin.

For centuries, Aretino was dismissed as a pornographer and blackmailer, an obscene footnote beside Petrarch and Ariosto. But scandal has a way of surviving. Nineteenth-century Romantics rediscovered him as a prophet of modernity. Today, critics trace his fingerprints across satire, reportage, and fiction. Balzac’s Parisian intrigues, Wilde’s aesthetic scandals, Patricia Highsmith’s Venetian thrillers—all echo Aretino’s mix of desire and dread.

And then there are the heirs who claimed him outright. The Marquis de Sade, that relentless anatomist of transgression, drew directly from Aretino’s playbook. Sade’s philosophical obscenities echo the structures of the Ragionamenti and the Sonetti lussuriosi: dialogues in which sexuality becomes both performance and interrogation, the bed a courtroom, the embrace a cross-examination. Like Aretino, Sade deployed eroticism not only to shock but to dismantle. Both men wielded obscenity as an intellectual weapon, stripping religion and politics of their sanctity by exposing their hypocrisies in the stark light of desire. When Sade has his libertines sneer at clerics who preach chastity while gorging on pleasure, he repeats Aretino’s barbed observation from a century earlier: “The cardinals pray with their lips while their hands wander beneath the skirts.”

Sade shared Aretino’s radical anti-clericalism, his love of dialogue as a tool of exposure, and his cultivation of notoriety as a literary strategy. The “Divine Marquis” may have been locked in the Bastille, but he carried in his cell Aretino’s scandalous legacy: the belief that obscenity could be philosophy, that provocation itself could be a mode of truth-telling.

Three centuries later, Guillaume Apollinaire would rediscover Aretino with a different eye. In the early twentieth century, Apollinaire praised him as a master who combined “the obscene with the sublime.” In works like Les Onze Mille Verges (The Eleven Thousand Rods), Apollinaire blurred the line between pornography and poetry, scandal and art, just as Aretino had done in his Venetian salons. He admired Aretino’s ability to turn audacity into literature, to make provocation itself a kind of aesthetic. “There is,” Apollinaire wrote of Aretino, “a grandeur in obscenity when it reveals the soul of an age.”

Apollinaire saw in Aretino a precedent for his own experiments: erotic audacity, satirical edge, literary innovation, and a fascination with scandal as aesthetic principle. Where Aretino staged dialogues between courtesans and matrons, Apollinaire crafted delirious erotic parables; where Aretino mocked clerics in his comedies, Apollinaire mocked bourgeois morality with surreal extravagance. Both men made literature dangerous again—texts that could be banned, burned, whispered, yet still survive.

In this long genealogy, Aretino is less a Renaissance curiosity than the origin point of a scandalous tradition that threads through Sade’s prisons, Apollinaire’s Paris, and our own scandal-hungry media. Each recognized that literature need not be safe, that scandal could be structure, that provocation could outlast sermons.

Most uncanny is how current Aretino feels. “What is whispered,” he mused in the Ragionamenti, “weighs more than what is spoken.” That line could be Twitter’s motto, or the tagline of an exposé-driven news cycle. Aretino would have thrived online: the cryptic tweet, the artful insinuation, the screenshot without context. He would have understood the logic of cancel culture, the way scandal circulates as performance, the way innuendo becomes currency.

Imagine him at the end, older now, dictating one last letter. The room is quieter, the scars deeper, the city outside still murmuring with intrigue. He knows his enemies wait for him to fall silent, but he also knows the page will outlive him. The candlelight no longer dances—it trembles. His scribe, older now too, no longer rushes. They have learned the rhythm of Aretino’s menace: slow, deliberate, inevitable.

He pauses mid-sentence, gazing out toward the lagoon. The bells of San Zanipolo toll the hour. A gondola glides past, its oars whispering against the water. Somewhere in the Palazzo Contarini dal Zaffo garden, jasmine blooms in the dark.

“Write this,” he says finally. “To be feared is to be remembered. To be remembered is to be read.”

The scribe hesitates. “And to be read?”

Aretino smiles. “Is to survive.”

He signs his name with a flourish—Pietro Aretino—and sets the quill down. The letter will travel, as they always have, faster than truth and deeper than rumor. It will be copied, misquoted, condemned, and preserved. It will be read by those who hate him and those who become him.

Centuries later, in a world of digital whispers and algorithmic outrage, his voice still echoes. In every scandal that unfolds like a story, in every tweet that wounds like a dagger, in every exposé that trembles with withheld revelation—Aretino is there. Not as ghost, but as architect. He understood what we are still learning: that scandal is not the opposite of art. It is one of its oldest forms. And in the hands of a master, it becomes not just spectacle, but structure. Not just provocation, but prophecy.

The trumpet still sounds. The question is not whether we hear it. The question is whether we recognize the tune.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Möbius Dreams: A Journey Of Identity Without End

From Nietzsche’s wanderings to Brodsky’s winters in Venice, identity loops like a Möbius strip—and augmented reality may carry those returns to us all.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 25, 2025

It begins, as so many pilgrimages of mind and imagination do, in Italy. To step into one of its cities—Florence with its domes, Rome with its ruins, Venice with its waters—is to experience time folding over itself. Stones are worn by centuries of feet; bells still toll hours as they did five hundred years ago; water mirrors façades that have witnessed empires rise and fall. Italy resists linearity. It does not advance from one stage to another; it loops, bends, recurs. For those who enter it, identity itself begins to feel less like a straight line than like a Möbius strip—a single surface twisting back on itself, where past and present, memory and desire, fold into one another.

Friedrich Nietzsche felt that pull most keenly. His journeys through Italy in the 1870s and 1880s were more than therapeutic sojourns for his fragile health; they were laboratories for thought. He spent time in Sorrento, where the Mediterranean air and lemon groves framed his writing of Human, All Too Human. In Genoa, he walked the cliffs above the port, watching the sun rise and fall in a rhythm that struck him as recurrence itself. In Turin, under its grand porticoes, he composed letters and aphorisms before his final collapse in 1889. And in Venice, he found a strange equilibrium between the city’s music, its tides, and his own restlessness. To his confidant Peter Gast, he wrote: “When I seek another word for ‘music,’ I never find any other word than ‘Venice.’” The gondoliers’ calls, the bells of San Marco, the lapping water—all repeated endlessly, yet never the same, embodying the thought that came to define him: the eternal return.

For Nietzsche, Italy was not a backdrop but a surface on which recurrence became tangible. Each city was a half-twist in the strip of his identity: Sorrento’s clarity, Genoa’s intensity, Turin’s collapse, Venice’s rhythm. He sensed that to live authentically meant to live as though each moment must be lived again and again. Italy, with its cycles of light, water, and bells, made that philosophy palpable.

Henry James —an American expatriate author with a different temperament—also found Italy less a destination than a structure. His Italian Hours (1909) reveals both rapture and unease. “The mere use of one’s eyes in Italy is happiness enough,” he confessed, yet he described Venice as “half fairy tale, half trap.” The city delighted and unsettled him in equal measure. He wandered Rome’s ruins, Florence’s galleries, Venice’s piazzas, and found that they all embodied a peculiar temporal layering—what he called “a museum of itself.” Italy was not history frozen; it was history repeating, haunting, resurfacing.

James’s fiction reflects that same looping structure. In The Aspern Papers, an obsessive narrator circles endlessly around an old woman’s letters, desperate to claim them, caught in a cycle of desire and denial. In The Portrait of a Lady, Isabel Archer discovers that the freedom she once thought she had secured returns as entrapment; her choices loop back on her with tragic inevitability. Even James’s prose mirrors the Möbius curve: sentences curl and return, digress and double back, before pushing forward. Reading James can feel like walking Venetian alleys—you arrive, but only by detour.

Joseph Brodsky, awarded the 1987 Nobel Prize in Literature after being exiled from the Soviet Union in 1972, found in Venice a winter refuge that became ritual. Each January he returned, until his death in 1996, and from those returns came Watermark (1992), a prose meditation that circles like the canals it describes. “Every January I went to Venice, the city of water, the city of mirrors, perhaps the city of illusions,” he wrote. Fog was his companion, “the city’s most faithful ghost.” Brodsky’s Venice was not Nietzsche’s radiant summer or James’s bustling salons. It was a city of silence, damp, reflection—a mirror to exile itself.

He repeated his returns like liturgy: sitting in the Caffè Florian, notebook in hand, crossing the Piazza San Marco through fog so dense the basilica dissolved, watching the lagoon become indistinguishable from the sky. Each January was the same, and yet not. Exile ensured that Russia was always present in absence, and Venice, indifferent to his grief yet faithful in its recurrence, became his Möbius surface. Each year he looped back as both the same man and someone altered.

What unites these three figures—Nietzsche, James, Brodsky—is not their similarity of thought but their recognition of Italy as a mirror for recurrence. Lives are often narrated as linear: childhood, youth, adulthood, decline. But Italy teaches another geometry. Like a Möbius strip, it twists perspective so that to move forward is also to circle back. An old anxiety resurfaces in midlife, but it arrives altered by experience. A desire once abandoned returns, refracted into new form. Nietzsche’s eternal return, James’s recursive characters, Brodsky’s annual exiles—all reveal that identity is not a line but a fold.

Italy amplifies this lesson. Its cities are not progressions but palimpsests. In Rome, one stands before ruins layered upon ruins: the Colosseum shadowed by medieval houses, Renaissance palaces built into ancient stones. In Florence, Brunelleschi’s dome rises above medieval streets, Renaissance paintings glow under electric light. In Venice, Byzantine mosaics shimmer beside Baroque marble while tourists queue for modern ferries. Each city is a surface where centuries loop, never erased, only folded over.

Philosophers and writers have groped toward metaphors for this looping. Nietzsche’s eternal return insists that each moment recurs infinitely. Derrida’s différance plays on the way meaning is always deferred, never fixed, endlessly circling. Borges imagined labyrinths where every turn leads back to the start. Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands describes identity as hybrid, cyclical, recursive. Italy stages all of these. To walk its piazzas is to feel history as Möbius surface: no beginning, no end, only continuous return.

But the Möbius journey of return is not without strain. Increasing overcrowding in Venice has made Piazza San Marco feel at times like a funnel for cruise-ship day trippers, raising questions of whether the city can survive its admirers. Rising costs of travel —inflated flights, pricier accommodations, surcharges for access—place the dream of pilgrimage out of reach for many. The very recurrence that writers once pursued with abandon now risks becoming the privilege of the few. And so the question arises: if one cannot return physically, can another kind of return suffice?

The answer is already being tested. Consider the Notre-Dame de Paris augmented exhibition, created by the French startup Histovery. Visitors carry a HistoPad, a touchscreen tablet, and navigate 850 years of the cathedral’s history. Faux stone tiles line the floor, stained-glass projections illuminate the walls, recordings of tolling bells echo overhead. With a swipe, one moves from the cathedral’s medieval construction to Napoleon’s coronation, then to the smoke and flames of the 2019 fire, then to the scaffolds of its restoration. It is a Möbius strip of architecture, looping centuries in minutes. The exhibition has toured globally, making Notre-Dame accessible to millions who may never step foot in Paris.

Italy, with its fragile architecture and layered history, is poised for the same transformation. Imagine a virtual walk through Venice’s alleys, dry and pristine, free of floods. A reconstructed Pompeii, where one can interact with residents moments before the eruption. Florence restored to its quattrocento brilliance, free of scaffolding and tourist throngs. For those unable to travel, AR offers an uncanny loop: recurrence of experience without presence.

Yet the question lingers: if one can walk through Notre-Dame without smelling the stone, without hearing the echo of one’s own footsteps, have they truly arrived? Recurrence, after all, has always been embodied. Nietzsche needed the Venetian fog to sting his lungs. James needed to feel the cold stones of a Florentine palazzo. Brodsky needed the damp silence of January to write his Watermark. The Möbius loop of identity was sensory, mortal, physical. Can pixels alone replicate that?

Perhaps this is too stark a contrast. Italy itself has always been both ruin and renewal, both stone and scaffolding, both presence and representation. Rome is simultaneously crumbling and rebuilt. Florence is both painted canvas and postcard reproduction. Venice is both sinking and endlessly photographed. Italy has survived by layering contradictions. Augmented reality may become one more layer.

Indeed, there is hope in this possibility. Technology can democratize what travel once restricted. The Notre-Dame exhibition allows a child in Kansas to toggle between centuries in an afternoon. It lets an elder who cannot fly feel the weight of medieval Paris. Applied to Italy, AR could make the experience of recurrence more widely available. Brodsky’s fog, Nietzsche’s bells, James’s labyrinthine sentences—these could be accessed not only by the privileged traveler but by anyone with a headset. The Möbius strip of identity, always looping, would expand to include more voices, more bodies, more experiences.

And yet AR is not a replacement so much as an extension. Those who can still travel will always seek stone, water, and bells. They will walk the Rialto and feel the wood beneath their feet; they will stand in Florence and smell the paint and dust; they will sit in Rome’s piazzas and feel the warmth of stone in the evening. These are not illusions but recurrences embodied. Technology will not end this; it will supplement it, add folds to the Möbius strip rather than cutting it.

In this sense, the Möbius book of identity continues to unfold. Nietzsche’s Italian sojourns, James’s expatriate wanderings, Brodsky’s winter rituals—all are chapters inscribed on the same continuous surface. Augmented reality will not erase those chapters; it will add marginalia, footnotes, annotations accessible to millions more. The loop expands rather than contracts.

So perhaps the hopeful answer is that recurrence itself becomes more democratic. Italy will always be there for those who return, in stone and water. But AR may ensure that those who cannot return physically may still enter the loop. A student in her dormitory may don a headset and hear the same Venetian bells that Nietzsche once called music. A retiree may walk through Florence’s restored galleries without leaving her home. A child may toggle centuries in Notre-Dame and begin to understand what it means to live inside a Möbius strip of time.

Identity, like travel, has never been a straight line. It is a fold, a twist, a surface without end. Italy teaches this lesson in stone and water. Technology may now teach it in pixels and projections. The Möbius book has no last page. It folds on—Nietzsche in Turin, James in Rome, Brodsky in Venice, and now, perhaps, millions more entering the same loop through new, augmented doors.

The self is not a line but a surface, infinite and recursive. And with AR, more of us may learn to trace its folds.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

THE REPUBLIC OF VOICES

At the height of its power in 1364, Venice was a republic where eloquence was currency and every piazza a stage.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 24, 2025

The bells began before sunrise. Their iron tongues tolled across the lagoon, vibrating against the damp November air, carrying from the Campanile of San Marco to the Arsenal’s yards and into the canals of Cannaregio. This was Venice in 1364—at the height of its power, its fleets unrivaled in the Mediterranean, its markets setting the prices of silk and spice across Europe. The city sat at the hinge of East and West, commanding trade routes between Byzantium, the Mamluk Sultanate, and Western Christendom. Venetian galleys, sleek and maneuverable, patrolled waters thick with pirates, their timbers assembled in the Arsenale di Venezia, a proto-industrial marvel capable of producing a galley in a single day. Venice was wood, stone, and gold, but above all, it was sound. “The city is never silent,” one German pilgrim marveled, “every tongue of Christendom and beyond seems to shout at once.”

Venice’s supremacy was not abstract. Its colonies in Crete and Cyprus served as staging posts; its consulates dotted the Dalmatian coast. In Constantinople and Alexandria, Venetians lived in fortified fondaci—walled compounds where merchants traded under their own laws. The wealth of Murano’s glassmakers, Rialto’s bankers, and San Polo’s textile dyers depended on this vast maritime lattice. Even the Doge—Venice’s elected head of state, chosen for life from among the patrician class, part monarch, part magistrate but hemmed in by councils—was more merchant than monarch. Venetian nobility was not feudal but commercial: a patrician might chair the Senate one year and finance a convoy to the Levant the next. Bills of exchange, maritime insurance, joint-stock ventures—all pioneered here—reduced risk and turned uncertainty into empire.

Yet the republic was also built on voices. Speech was its second currency, flowing through churches, palaces, markets, and courts. Treaties were sealed with words before they were inked; rumors shifted markets as much as cargoes; sermons inflamed consciences long before decrees reached the streets.

In San Marco, the Basilica of mosaics and incense, the preacher’s voice dominated. On feast days friars addressed audiences that blurred patrician and plebeian, women and sailors, artisans and merchants. A Franciscan, recalling the Black Death, likened Venetian greed to “a contagion that spreads from house to house.” Andrea Dandolo, the Doge who also wrote a chronicle of his age, noted the murmurs of unease that followed. A parable about false shepherds might by nightfall become tavern gossip, retooled as an attack on patrician governors.

In 1364, Venice granted Petrarch a palazzo on the Riva degli Schiavoni in exchange for his library, a collection that would become the foundation of the Biblioteca Marciana. Known as the father of Humanism and now often called the father of the Italian Renaissance, he was among Europe’s most influential figures—poet of the Canzoniere, rediscoverer of Cicero’s letters, and advocate for the revival of classical eloquence. From his Venetian residence, he praised the city as “a republic not only of ships and laws, but of eloquence itself, where voices, raised in harmony or dissent, bind the state together.” For him, Venice was not only a naval empire but also a theater of speech.

Across the piazza in the Doge’s Palace, words carried a different weight. The cavernous Sala del Maggior Consiglio could hold a thousand patricians, their decisions shaping treaties and wars. The Doge spoke little, his ritual response to petitions—“Si vedrà”, “It will be seen”—an eloquence of restraint. More dramatic were the relazioni, oral reports of ambassadors returning from Constantinople or Cairo. Though later transcribed, in the fourteenth century they were performances. An envoy describing the Byzantine emperor’s throne gestured so vividly that senators felt transported to the imperial court.

Yet it was in the Rialto that Venice’s speech was most raw, where chatter became commerce and gossip became power. By day, the wooden bridge creaked under merchants and beggars, its planks worn smooth by boots from every corner of Europe. Below, spices from Alexandria, silk from Cathay, and pepper from India changed hands, but so too did stories. “The Rialto is a world itself,” wrote the chronicler Marino Sanudo, “where the news of all Christendom and beyond is traded swifter than spices.” Rumors of Ottoman fleets could shift the price of cinnamon. Satirical verses, recited sotto voce, mocked the deafness of patricians: “A house of nodding heads, deaf to its people.”

And when night fell, the Rialto became something else entirely. Carnival transformed it into a stage where anonymity and satire thrived. Masked singers, some of them patrician youths disguised as artisans, improvised verses lampooning senators and guild leaders. One chronicler described young nobles in Greek disguise singing ballads about the Senate’s obsession with ceremony. The laughter echoed across the Grand Canal, tolerated because, as Venetians said, “the republic breathes satire as easily as air.”

The Grand Canal itself was Venice’s liquid stage. By day it was an artery of commerce, alive with the slap of oars, the curses of gondoliers, the hammering of crates. By dusk the atmosphere shifted. Lanterns swayed from boats, their reflections shimmering across the black water. Gondoliers sang what would one day evolve into the barcarolle. Noble families staged boat processions with lutes and trumpets, music drifting across the canal in competing layers of sound. Commerce by day, serenade by night—the same canal a bazaar and a ballroom.

And then there was the Piazza San Marco, the great stage of the republic. On feast days, choirs filled the basilica, their plainsong swelling into polyphony that ricocheted off Byzantine domes. Trumpeters announced the Doge, banners unfurled, and processions wound through the square until, as Dandolo wrote, “the piazza shone with gold and sounded with voices and trumpets.” During Carnival, the sacred gave way to the profane: jugglers, acrobats, and improvisatori recited comic verses in dialect. A fire-breather might draw crowds near the bronze horses while a masked singer mocked senators. It was noisy, unruly, profoundly Venetian—a place where art, politics, and voice collided.

Artisans, too, had their stages. The scuole, confraternities of tradesmen, were gatherings where chants gave way to orations. Statutes might be inscribed, but obligations were enforced aloud. A shoemakers’ statute from 1360 commanded that “each master shall stand and speak before his fellows, giving account not only of his work but of his conduct.” Eloquence was honor; to falter was to risk shame.

The courts offered a harsher stage. Justice, too, was spoken. The Statuta Veneta emphasized testimony over parchment: “testimony is judged not by parchment but by voice.” In 1362, a fisherman accused of theft protested, “Non rubai, ma trovai.”—“I did not steal, I found.” His trembling voice, the notary observed, betrayed him. Eloquence could acquit; faltering speech could condemn.

And words could also damn. After the plague, prophets thundered in piazzas, sailors cursed saints in taverns, women repeated visions too vividly. One inquisitorial record recalls a woman accused of declaring, “the plague is God’s punishment for the pride of merchants.” Whether prophecy or lament, her words were evidence of heresy.

To live in Venice was to live in a polyphony of languages. From Dalmatia to Crete, Cyprus to Trebizond, the city’s empire infused it with voices. The pilgrim Ludolf of Sudheim marveled that in one square he heard “Latin, Greek, Saracen, and Hebrew, all arguing.” Translators ferried not only goods but ideas—fragments of Averroes, Byzantine theology, Jewish philosophy. Did a spice-seller at the Rialto know he was transmitting the seeds of the Renaissance?

In patrician libraries and monastic scriptoria, another kind of voice was taking shape: Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, arriving in Latin translation, read aloud in candlelit chambers. By 1364, copies of Aristotle’s Politics and Nicomachean Ethics were circulating among patricians. What did it mean to live a life of virtue? Could the common good outweigh private interest? Such debates mattered in a republic balancing mercantile ambition with civic restraint.

Thomas Aquinas, too, was debated in Dominican houses. His Summa Theologica offered a scaffolding that united reason and faith. Did divine law supersede human law, or did the latter participate in the former? A friar might thunder against usury on Sunday while echoing Aquinas’s careful distinctions on just exchange.

What is striking is that these scholastic voices did not remain confined to cloisters. They mingled with guild disputations, senatorial deliberations, carnival satire. And just beyond the horizon, Humanism was stirring. Petrarch, uneasy yet pivotal, urged Venetians to recover eloquence from Cicero and Livy. The republic was poised between worlds: the scholastic synthesis of Aquinas and the humanist insistence that civic life could be ennobled by rhetoric and classical virtue. Venice in 1364 was thus not only a theater of speech but also a laboratory of ideas.

At dusk, the bells tolled once more. Gondoliers sang across the black canal, masked youths mocked senators in the Rialto, choirs rehearsed in San Marco. Senators lingered in debate, artisans rehearsed speeches, children recited prayers before sleep. Venice in 1364 was not only a republic of ships, coins, and statutes. It was a republic of voices. Andrea Dandolo wrote that “our city is a harmony of voices, discordant yet united, a choir upon the waters.”

Perhaps that is the truest way to understand the city at its zenith. Its power lay not only in fleets or treaties, but in the ceaseless interplay of sound and sense: the preacher stirring unease, the envoy swaying senators, the gondolier echoing Aristotle, the satirist mocking the elite. The same city that hammered out galleys in the Arsenale was also hammering out philosophies in its libraries, rhythms in its shipyards, and laughter in its carnivals. To live in Venice in 1364 was to inhabit a world where speech, spectacle, and speculation were indivisible, where every bridge or piazza might become a stage. The republic endured not because it silenced discord but because it orchestrated it—turning sermon, satire, and song into the polyphony of civic life. Venice was, and remains, a choir upon the waters.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

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